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ABSTRACT
I examine the debate between substantivalists and relationalists about the ontological
character of spacetime and conclude it is not well posed. I argue that the so-called
Hole Argument does not bear on the debate, because it provides no clear criterion to
distinguish the positions. I propose two such precise criteria and construct separate
arguments based on each to yield contrary conclusions, one supportive of something like
relationalism and the other of something like substantivalism. The lesson is that one
must fix an investigative context in order to make such criteria precise, but different
investigative contexts yield inconsistent results. I examine questions of existence about
spacetime structures other than the spacetime manifold itself to argue that it is more
fruitful to focus on pragmatic issues of physicality, a notion that lends itself to several
different explications, all of philosophical interest, none privileged a priori over any of
the others. I conclude by suggesting an extension of the lessons of my arguments to the
broader debate between realists and instrumentalists.
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[W]e must bear in mind that the scientific or science-producing value of the efforts made
to answer these old standing questions is not to be measured by the prospect they afford
us of ultimately obtaining a solution, but by their effect in stimulating men to a thorough
investigation of nature. To propose a scientific question presupposes scientific knowledge,
and the questions which exercise men’s minds in the present state of science may very
likely be such that a little more knowledge would shew us that no answer is possible.
The scientific value of the question, How do bodies act on one another at a distance?
is to be found in the stimulus it has given to investigations into the properties of the
intervening medium.
James Clerk Maxwell
“Attraction”, Encyclopædia Brittanica (9th ed.)
[B]etween a cogent and enlightened “realism” and a sophisticated “instrumentalism”
there is no significant difference—no difference that makes a difference.
Howard Stein
“Yes, but. . . —Some Skeptical Remarks on Realism and Anti-Realism”
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1 Introduction
The revival of the debate in recent years in the broader community of philosophers over the ontic
status of spacetime can trace its roots, in part, to its revival in the community of physicists. Be-
lot (1996) and Belot and Earman (2001), for instance, claim that philosophers ought to take the
debate seriously because many physicists do. I do not think that fact suffices as a good reason for
philosophers to take the debate as interesting, much less even well posed, and so enter into it. The
active work of physicists on our best physical theories should provide the fodder for the work of the
philosopher of physics most of the time. Sometimes, however, the physicists are confused or just
mistaken, and it is then our job to try to help set matters straight. I believe that is the case here.1
Other philosophers in recent work have taken inspiration from the traditional debates themselves.
Maudlin (1993), for instance, after a pre`cis of the debate in the 17th and 18th centuries and Kant’s
attempt to sidestep it, concludes, “[G]ranting that the world is an sich a spatiotemporal object, we
must face a fundamental problem: Are space and time entities in their own right?” In this paper, I
dispute that “must.”
A virtue of Maudlin’s approach, which his work shares with that of many other contemporary
philosophers no matter their inspiration, is the foundation of his arguments on the structures of our
best physical theories and the use of those structures to guide metaphysical argument. I think the
method falls short, however, in so far as it treats those structures in abstraction from their uses
in actual scientific enterprises, both theoretical and experimental. This lacuna leaves the debate
merely formulaic, without real content, at the mercy of clever sophistications without basis in real,
empirically grounded scientific knowledge in the fullest sense.
Stein (1994, p. 1) admirably sums up the situation as I see it. I quote him at length, as he says
it better than I could:
[L]et me . . . hazard a rough diagnosis of the reason why some things that are (in my view)
true, important, and obvious tend to get lost sight of in our discussions. I think “lost sight
of” is the right phrase: it is a matter of perspective, of directions of looking and lines of
sight. As at an earlier time philosophy was affected by a disease of system-building—the
e´sprit de syste`me against which a revulsion set in toward the end of the last century—so
it has (I believe) in our own time been affected by an excess of what might be called
the e´sprit de technique. . . : a tendency both to concentrate on such matters of detail as
allow of highly formal systematic treatment (which can lead to the neglect of important
matters on which sensible even if vague things can be said), and (on the other hand),
in treating matters of the latter sort, to subject them to quasi-technical elaboration
beyond what, in the present state of knowledge, they can profitably bear. [W]hat I have
described can be characterized rather precisely as a species of scholasticism. . . . In so
far as the word “scholasticism,” in its application to medieval thought, has a pejorative
connotation, it refers to a tendency to develop sterile technicalities—characterized by
1See Curiel (2001, 2009) for extensive arguments to this effect on closely related matters, and for a defence of this
claim as a fruitful philosophical attitude.
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ingenuity out of relation to fruitfulness; and to a tradition burdened by a large set
of standard counterposed doctrines, with stores of arguments and counterarguments.
In such a tradition, philosophical discussion becomes something like a series of games
of chess, in which moves are largely drawn from a familiar repertoire, with occasional
strokes of originality—whose effect is to increase the repertoire of known plays.
In the spirit of Stein’s diagnosis, rather than something formally sophisticated I’m going to propose
something crude and simple: in order to try to avoid the sort of sterility that purely formal technical
elaboration can lead to, we should look at the way that spacetime structures are used in practice to
model real systems in order to try to make progress on issues closely related to those treated in the
standard debate. For I do think that there are important, deep questions that we can make progress
on in the vicinity of that debate, questions of the sort that Maxwell alludes to in the passage I quoted
as one of this paper’s epigraphs. As Maxwell intimates, however, in order for such questions to be
investigated profitably, they must be such as to support and stimulate “the investigation of nature.”
And that, I submit, can be accomplished only when the questions bear on scientific knowledge in all
its guises, as theoretical comprehension and understanding, as evidential warrant and interpretative
tool in the attempt to assimilate novel experimental results, as technical and practical expertise in
the design and performance of experiments, and as facility in the bringing together of theory and
experiment in such a way that each may fruitfully inform the other.
To that end, in this paper I will argue that the way to find the philosophically and scientifically
fruitful gold in the metaphysical dross is to formulate and address the questions in a way that
explicitly makes contact with both the theoretical and the experimental aspects of our best current
knowledge about the kinds of physical system at issue. One way of trying to do that is to pose
and investigate the questions explicitly in the context of what I will call an investigative framework:
roughly speaking, a set of more or less exactly articulated and fixed theoretical structures for the
modeling of physical systems, along with a family of experimental practices and techniques suited
to the investigation of the type of systems the theoretical tools appropriately model, in the way the
theory actually models them. Different investigative frameworks, as I show by constructive example,
provide different natural criteria with which to render determinate content to the question of the
ontic status of spacetime, with none privileged sub specie æternitatis over any of the others. Those
different criteria yield different answers to the question, suitably formulated in the given frameworks.
This should not be surprising, I think. After all, different sorts of scientific investigations naturally
assume and rely on different relations between individual spacetime points and metrical (and other
forms of spatiotemporal) structure, and it is those relations that are supposed to serve as the criteria
for existence of individual spacetime points; the mathematical formalism of the theory does not by
itself fix a univocal relation with clear physical significance between points of the spacetime manifold
and geometrical structures, both local and global ones, that live on the manifold. I therefore dispute
not only the force of Maudlin’s “must,” but even more the cogency of the demand itself, baldly
formulated.
I begin in §2 with an examination of a popular argument, the so-called Hole Argument, that
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seems to urge a form of relationalism. I do this for two reasons. First, because advertence to the
argument has become something of a mannerism in the debate, it must be confronted; I conclude
that it has no bearing one way or another on the issues the debate purports to address. Second,
I discuss it because it yields a useful schema for the production of concrete criteria in the terms
of which one can try to explicate the difference between substantivalists and relationalists, such as
it is. I use that schema—whether the identification of spacetime points must depend on the prior
stipulation of metrical structure—to frame the argument of the subsequent two sections of the paper.
In each of those two sections I make the schematic criterion concrete in the context of a particular
form of investigative framework so as to construct two arguments with contrary conclusions, one in
support of something like relationalism and the other something like substantivalism to show that
one can make the debate concrete in any of a number of precise, physically significant ways, none a
priori privileged over the others, and that those ways will not in general agree in their consequences.2
The opposed arguments and contrary conclusions of §§3–4, in conjunction with the dismissal
of the Hole Argument, do not decisively refute the claim that there is a single, canonical way to
explicate the idea of a spacetime point and so to enter into debate over the existence of such a
thing. As I urge in §5, they strongly suggest it is a question best settled in the context of a
particular form of investigation. The investigation itself in tandem with pragmatic considerations
and æsthetic predilections will guide the investigator in settling the form of the question and so
the search for its answer. For a given spacetime theory, and even a given model within the theory,
depending on one’s purposes and the tools one allows oneself, either one can treat spacetime points as
entities and individuate and identify them a priori, or one can in any of a number of ways construct
spacetime points as factitious, convenient pseudo-entities, as it were. Nothing of intrinsic physical
significance hangs on the choice, and so a fortiori science cannot guide us if we attempt to choose
sub specie æternitatis between the alternatives—such a choice must become, if anything, an exercise
in scholastic metaphysics only.
In §6, I extend the discussion to a host of other types of spacetime structure, such as Killing
2I do not know of anyone in the literature who adopts exactly the schematic criterion I propose to found my two
arguments. (Perhaps Hoefer 1996, 1998 comes the closest.) I use it because I think it captures the flavor of the
criteria that are often stipulated when one or the other position is being argued for or against, viz., schematically
speaking, that the question of the existence of spacetime points boils down to the relation of those points to some
fixed, underlying geometrical structure, such as the metric. (See, e.g., Earman 1989, Butterfield 1989, Maudlin 1990,
1993, Rynasiewicz 1994, Belot 1999, Dorato 2000, Huggett 2006, Pooley 2006, 2013, Belot 2011.) This is all I require
for the overall argument of the paper. I use this particular schema, moreover, as only one example of the sort of
criterion one could with some justification rely on in this debate, not because I think it is canonical or privileged
in some way, but because it is popular and has a lot to say for it prima facie. My hope is that showing how the
debate breaks down when this particular criterion is used will, at the least, strongly suggest that it would similarly
break down no matter what sort of purely formal criterion of that sort one used. DiSalle (1994, 2006) is a notable
example of a contemporary philosopher who takes an approach much more sympathetic to my own. (See Friedman
2007 for a thoughtful discussion of DiSalle’s work.) Robert Geroch (in private conversation) is a notable example of
a contemporary physicist who does so. Dorato (2006) is an interesting case of a philosopher who agrees with me that
the contemporary debate is not well posed, but thinks there is a best answer to a proper reformulation of the debate.
Rynasiewicz (1996) agrees with me that the contemporary debate is not well posed, but he uses arguments I would
not endorse.
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fields and topological invariants. The attempt to formulate criteria for the physicality of such other
structures adds weight to the conclusion that such questions require concrete realization in the
context of something akin to real science in order to acquire substantive content. I conclude in
§7 with a brief attempt to show that the arguments of this paper ramify into the debate between
realists and instrumentalists more generally, by dint, in part, of the picture of science the arguments
implicitly rely on. The overarching lesson I draw is that metaphysical argumentation abstracted
from the pragmatics of the scientific enterprise as we know it—science as an actually achieved state
of knowledge and as an ongoing enterprise of inquiry—is vain. Very little of real substance can be
learned about the nature of the physical world by studying only theoretical structures in isolation
from how they hook up to experimental knowledge in real scientific practice, as is the endemic
practice in the current debate. In particular, tracking the alleged ontological commitments of a
theory based on an analysis of its formal structure alone is not a viable approach to the issue, as we
cannot know what structures the theory provides have real physical significance, and what sort of
real physical significance they do have, unless we understand how the theory is successfully applied
in practice.
The constructions I found the arguments on require the use of advanced mathematical machinery
from the theory of general relativity. The format of the paper does not allow for an introduction
to most of it. (For the interested reader, Wald 1984 or Malament 2012, for example, contains
comprehensive coverage of all material required.) I have tried to segregate it as much as possible so
that those who do not want to trudge through it will not have to while still following the general
argument. For those who do want to skip most of the technical material, I recommend the following:
in §2, ignore the sketch of the Hole Argument (the second and third paragraphs of the section),
but read the rest; in §3, read the first two paragraphs and the last one; in §4, read the first two
paragraphs (including definition 4.1), and the final two paragraphs. (The remainder of the paper
should not pose strenuous technical difficulties.) This course will convey almost the entirety of my
argument, bar supportive details the technical material purports to provide.
2 The Hole Argument
In recent times, several physicists and philosophers have construed Einstein’s infamous Hole Argu-
ment so as to place it at the heart of questions about the ontic status of spacetime points. Its lesson,
so claimed, is that one cannot identify spacetime points without reliance on metrical structure, that
there is no “bare manifold of points”, as it were, under the metric field.3 In the contemporary liter-
ature, the debate is often posed thus: should the manifold M by itself or the ordered pair (M, gab)
be properly construed as the represention of “physical spacetime”?
3See, e.g., Belot (1996) and Gaul and Rovelli (2000). Einstein himself originally formulated the Hole Argument
to highlight what he regarded as problems of indeterminism for any generally covariant theory. See Einstein (1914)
and Einstein and Grossmann (1914) for two versions of the original argument, Norton (1989, 1993) for historical
and critical discussion, and Earman and Norton (1987) for the introduction of the argument to the contemporary
philosophical debate.
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This, in brief, is the argument. Fix a spacetime model (M, gab).
4 For ease of exposition, we
stipulate that the spacetime be globally hyperbolic, and so possesses a global Cauchy surface, Σ.
(We could do without this condition at the cost of unnecessary technical details.) Say that we know
the metric tensor on Σ and on the entire region of spacetime to its causal past, J−[Σ]. (Note that
J−[Σ] contains Σ.) It is known that this forms a well set Cauchy problem, and so there is a solution
to the Einstein field equation that uniquely extends gab on J
−[Σ] to a metric tensor on all of M,
yielding the original spacetime we fixed.5 In particular, the solution to the Cauchy problem fixes the
metric on the region to the causal future of Σ, J+[Σ]. Now, let φ be a diffeomorphism that is the
identity on J−[Σ] and smoothly becomes non-trivial on J+[Σ]− Σ. No matter what else one takes
the significance of the diffeomorphism invariance of general relativity to be, at a minimum it must
include the proposition that the application of a diffeomorphism to a solution of the Einstein field
equation yields another, possibly distinct solution. Apply φ to gab (but not to M itself); this yields
a seemingly different metric—a different “physical state of the gravitational field”—on J+[Σ]−Σ, in
the sense that the same points of J+[Σ]−Σ now carry (in general) a different value for the metric.
This is the crux of the issue, that the diffeomorphism applied to the metric has yielded a different
tensor field in the sense that the same points of the spacetime manifold now carry a different metric
tensor than before.
We now face a dilemma, the argument continues (Earman and Norton 1987): we can either hold
that the fixation of the metric on J−[Σ] does not determine the metric on J+[Σ] − Σ, a radical
form of seeming indeterminism, or else we can conclude that spacetime points in some sense have no
identifiability or existence or what-have-you independent of the prior fixation of the metric tensor.
The argument concludes that the denial of the independent existence of spacetime points is the
lesser of the evils (or, depending on one’s viewpoint, the greater of the goods).6
4I may seem to be biasing the argument already, by demanding that one fix both a manifold and a metric to
fix a model of spacetime. In fact, though, by “model of spacetime” here, I explicitly mean “manifold cum metrical
structure”, irrespective of how the debate over what really represents physical spacetime resolves itself, so there is no
bias here.
5This is not, strictly speaking, accurate. If no restrictions are placed on the form of the metric, then in general
the initial-value problem is not well set. Indeed, even a few known “physical” solutions to the Einstein field equation
possess no well set initial-value formulation, for example those representing homogeneous dust and some types of
perfect fluid. (See, e.g., Geroch 1996.) We can ignore these technicalities for our purposes, though it may raise a
serious problem for those who worry about indeterminism in the theory, one which, to the best of my knowledge, has
not been addressed in the literature.
6Though it does not seem to be recognized in the literature, there are two different versions of the argument used
by different investigators. The one I rehearse here can be thought of, in a sense, as a generalization of the other. The
more specialized form, which Einstein himself formulated and used, assumes that spacetime has a region of compact
closure, the nominal hole, which is devoid of ponderable matter (i.e., in which the stress-energy tensor vanishes)
though it itself is surrounded by a region of non-trivial stress-energy; the diffeomorphism is then stipulated to vanish
everywhere except in the hole, and the argument goes more or less as in the general case, with the emendation that
now it is the distribution of ponderable matter that does not suffice to fix the physical state of the gravitational field.
(Earman 1989, for example, uses the more general argument, whereas Stachel 1993 uses the more specialized form.) I
think the specialized form of the argument introduces a dangerously misleading red herring, viz., physical differences
between regions of spacetime with non-vanishing stress-energy and those without. There seems to me no principled
way within the context of the theory itself to distinguish between such regions in a way that bears on metaphysical
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I want to make a crude and simple proposal, for it seems to me that the debate has lost sight of a
crude and simple, and yet fundamentally important, fact: just because the mathematical apparatus
of a theory appears to admit particular mathematical manipulations does not eo ipso mean that
those manipulations admit of physically significant interpretation, much less that those apparently
mathematical manipulations are even coherent in and of themselves.7 One has the mathematical
structure of the theory; one is not free to do whatever it is one wants with that formalism and
then claim, with no foundation in practice, that what one has done has physical import.8 Once one
has the mathematical formalism in hand, one must determine what one is allowed to do with it,
“allowed” in the sense that what one does respects the way that the formalism actually represents
physical systems. A simple example will help explain what I mean: adding 3-vectors representing
spatial points in Newtonian mechanics. This shows the need for an investigative context for the
fixing of what counts as admissible manipulations of the mathematical formalism, for as a physical
operation adding spatial points makes no sense—there is no sense to be had from the idea of linearly
superposing two different spatial points in Newtonian theory as a representation of a physical state
of affairs. For the purposes of computing factitious quantities such as the center of mass, however,
it does make sense, though, again, not as an operation that has a physical correlate in the world.
General relativity, in its usual incarnation, is formulated with the use of differential manifolds
with pseudo-Riemannian metrics. It does not ipso facto follow that every well formed mathematical
operation one can perform on a manifold with such a metric has physical significance. It arguably
makes mathematical sense to apply a diffeomorphism of the manifold to the metric only, and not
to the underlying manifold at the same time. That fact by itself does not imbue the operation with
physical significance. It is exactly considerations such as the Hole Argument highlights that show
how diffeomorphisms ought to be applied to solutions of the Einstein field equation so as to have
or ontological issues. One of the regions, that with stress-energy, has non-trivial Ricci curvature; the other does not,
though it may have non-trivial Weyl curvature. That difference by itself, the only one formulable strictly based on
the theory, can tell us nothing in the abstract about the ontic status of the spacetime manifold. The introduction of
the difference seems rather to bespeak an old prejudice that material sources should suffice to determine the physical
state of associated fields, but this is not true even in classical Maxwell theory. Indeed, the issue seems much less of
a problem in general relativity, for in the case of the Maxwell field we cannot determine a physically unique solution
without imposing boundary conditions; otherwise, we are always free to add a field with vanishing divergence and
curl to a solution to yield another that will have different physical effects on charged bodies. In general relativity, one
does not need to do anything of the sort to determine a physically unique solution, so long as the initial data is well
behaved in the first place. (See, e.g., Wald 1984, ch. 10, pp. 243–268.)
7Weatherall (2014), whose conclusions I endorse, argues vigorously that the sort of manipulation employed in the
standard form of the Hole Argument does not make even mathematical sense. For the sake of argument, however, I
will assume here that it does. (If one likes, one can take that assumption as being in the service of a reductio.)
8Stachel (1993, p. 149) neatly describes the current attitude in the literature towards mathematics in physical
theories:
A current trend among some philosophers of science is toward what I will call “the fetishism of mathe-
matics.” By this I mean the tendency to assume that all the mathematical elements introduced in the
formalization of a physical theory must necessarily correspond to something meaningful in the physical
theory and, even more, in the world that the physical theory purports to help us understand.
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physical significance. When one applies a diffeomorphism, one must apply it to both the manifold
and the metric. As I shall argue, no other procedure has physical content.9
The Hole Argument is obviated by the fact that the application of φ to the manifold cum metric
results only in a different presentation of the same intrinsic metrical structure. All observers, no
matter which diffeomorphic presentation of the manifold cum metric they use in their respective
models, will agree on what is of intrinsic physical significance in the possible interaction of physical
systems. (Are those two bodies in physical contact? Is heat flowing from this one to that or vice-
versa? Can a light-signal be sent from this to that? Is gravitational radiation present? And so on.)
There is no logical or physical contradiction in taking different diffeomorphic presentations of the
manifold cum metric each as the representation of the same physical structure. One must simply
stipulate that, in the context of general relativity, the application of a diffeomorphism to the metric
is a physically well defined procedure only when one also applies it to the (given presentation of the)
manifold itself. The worry about determinism thus evaporates, doing away with the dilemma. How
one then goes on to try to characterize the ontic nature of spacetime points, if that is the sort of
thing one is into, may be influenced by this restriction on the applicability of diffeomorphisms to
solutions of the Einstein field equation, or it may not. The point of fundamental importance is that
this restriction results from both pragmatic and semantic considerations about the way that one may
employ the formal apparatus the theory provides so as to respect how solutions to the Einstein field
equation represent physically possible spacetimes in practice—how it is that the formal structures
of the theory acquire real physical meaning.
In sum, I do not see why the Hole Argument drives one to conclude that one should or should not
attribute some form of existence to spacetime points independent of the metrical structure. There
is no logical or physical contradiction, for example, in taking the image of a point under the action
of φ to be “the same spacetime point” as its pre-image, as depicted in a different presentation of
spacetime, irrespective of metrical structure. In this case, a spacetime point would be something
like an equivalence class of ordinary mathematical points under the relation of being related by a
diffeomorphism. An exact formulation that avoids having this idea collapse into triviality—given
any finite number of points on a manifold, there is a diffeomorphism that maps those points onto
any permutation of them, which seems to leave one with a single equivalence class containing all
9If one adopts a certain definition of a differential manifold, viz., that it is an equivalence class of “diffeomor-
phic presentations”, then one will say that the proposed operation does not make even purely mathematical sense.
(Weatherall 2014 comes to the same conclusion, based on different, but related, arguments.) S2, for example, can
presented as a certain submanifold of R3, or as a certain submanifold of a 17-dimensional hyperbolid, or simply as a
manifold in its own right; S2 × R2 can be presented, as here, as a direct product of manifolds, or as R4 with a line
removed; and so on. In this case, “pushing tensors around on the manifold by a diffeomorphism without also pushing
the points around”, as required by the Hole Argument, is not an unambiguous notion, for strictly speaking manifold
points are defined only up to diffeomorphism in the first place. I do in fact accept the definition of a differential
manifold as an equivalence class, but I am trying to be as charitable as possible to the proponents of the debate and
the arguments standardly deployed in its carrying out, so I am willing to grant for the sake of argument that the
required manipulations make mathematical sense. In any event, it is not only philosophers who explicitly attempt to
manipulate manifolds and objects in them, in the context of general relativity, in the way the Hole Argument requires;
see, e.g., Pons and Salisbury (2005) for physicists explicitly doing so.
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points—requires some refinement. One could do something like the following: a spacetime point is
a physical entity that one can uniquely, or at least adequately and reliably, individuate and identify
by what is of intrinsic physical significance at the physical event that occupies it, no matter the
diffeomorphic presentation of the manifold of events; it is an entity, in other words, individuated
and identified by the equivalence class of physical events under diffeomorphic presentation.10 If one
wants to respond that bare spacetime points per se even with what are tantamount to unique labels
attached (if the spacetime is not overly symmetric) are dependent on physical phenomena under this
definition and inobservable to boot, and so unnecessary in the formulation of physical theory, so as
to conclude that they have no independent metaphysical existence of one sort or another, I would
not necessarily disagree, but neither should I think that one requires the Hole Argument to make
the point, for the game of the Hole Argument is that one cannot identify spacetime points in the
absence of metrical structure. One need not invoke or rely on metrical structure to make the sort
of identification I suggest, as I will show by construction in §4.
The basis for my rejection of the Hole Argument, that a proper understanding of diffeomorphism
invariance and the way to properly implement it as a formal procedure vitiates it, rests on a deeper
point. I think the most unproblematic and uncontroversial claim one can make about diffeomorphic
freedom is that it embodies an irremediable mathematical arbitrariness in the apparatus provided by
general relativity for the modeling of physical systems: the choice of the presentation of the spacetime
manifold and metric one uses to model a physical system is fixed only up to diffeomorphism.11 There
are restrictions on how one can apply diffeomorphisms to solutions in practice in order for that
application to be consistent with the physical content of the theory, and those restrictions may have
philosophical significance, but they may not as well. By itself, that there is arbitrariness tells us
nothing of interest about the theory.
A comparison is edifying. Classical mechanics as embodied in either Lagrangian or Hamiltonian
mechanics has a similar arbitrariness, slightly different in each formulation of the theory. In La-
grangian mechanics, one is free to choose the Lagrangian function itself on the tangent bundle of
configuration space up to the addition of a scalar field derived from a closed 1-form on configuration
space (or, in more traditional terms, up to the addition of a total time-derivative of a function of
configuration coordinates) without changing the family of solutions the Lagrangian determines.12 In
Hamiltonian mechanics, one is free to choose any symplectomorphism between the space of states
and the cotangent bundle of configuration space, i.e., one may choose, up to symplectomorphism,
any presentation of phase space (or, in more traditional terms, any complete set of canonical coor-
10Such a characterization would not necessarily rely on metrical structure at a point since, in general, one needs to
fix the physical state on an open neighborhood of a point in order to fix the metric structure at that point by way
of the Einstein field equation; one cannot solve the Einstein field equation “point by point”, as it were. The easiest
way to see this is to note the non-uniqueness of vacuum solutions. This is intimately bound up with the fact that the
value of the stress-energy tensor at a point does not determine the value of the Weyl tensor (conformal structure) at
that point.
11Einstein (1924) makes a closely related point himself: “The fact that the general theory of relativity has no
preferred space-time coordinates which stand in a determinate relation to the metric is more a characteristic of the
mathematical form of the theory than of its physical content.”
12See, e.g., Curiel (2014a).
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dinates), without changing the family of solutions the Hamiltonian function determines.13 One feels
no lack of understanding of Lagrangian mechanics, no lacuna in its conceptual resources, merely
because one is free to choose the form of the Lagrangian with wide latitude; just so, in Hamiltonian
mechanics one is not driven to investigate the ontic status of points in phase space or of the physical
quantities whose values one uses to label those points, which ones get nominated ‘configuration’ and
which ‘momentum’, merely because one is free to choose whatever symplectomorphism one likes in
its presentation. Consider the fact that one can run an argument analogous to the Hole Argument in
the context of Hamiltonian mechanics, substituting “phase space” for “spacetime manifold”, “sym-
plectomorphism” for “diffeomorphism” and “symplectic structure” for “metric”. Does that show
anything of intrinsic physical significance? No serious person would argue so. And in this case, it
would be manifestly absurd to “apply a symplectomorphism only to the symplectic structure and
not the underlying manifold”: in general the underlying manifold is a cotangent bundle and the
symplectic structure is the canonical one on it; pushing the symplectic structure around on its own
will yield a new symplectic structure that is not the canonical one, and so one manifestly unphysical
for the purpose of formulating Hamilton’s equation.
The choice of Lagrangian or the choice of symplectomorphism rests on nothing more than prag-
matic considerations of the type adumbrated by Carnap (1956) in his discussion of the choice of a
linguistic framework for the investigation of philosophical and physical problems.14 One chooses on
the basis of nothing more than what puts one at ease in any of a variety of ways, from pragmatic
considerations such as what will be simple or useful for a particular investigation, to those based
on historical custom and æsthetic predilection. It is clear that the existence of inevitable, more or
less arbitrary, non-physical elements in the presentation of the models of a theory by itself does not
require of one a decision on the ontic status of any entities putatively designated by the mathe-
matical structures of either Lagrangian or Hamiltonian mechanics. More to the point, it is clear in
these cases that the physical significance of the theory’s models is not masked or polluted by the
unavoidable arbitrariness in the details of their presentations.
In the same way, the diffeomorphic freedom in the presentation of relativistic spacetimes does not
ipso facto require philosophical elucidation, in so far as it in no way prevents us from focusing on and
investigating what is of true physical relevance in systems that general relativity models, what one
may think of as the intrinsic physics of the systems, so long as one respects the pragmatic conditions
for the application of diffeomorphisms to solutions. It is neither formal relations nor substantive
entities that remain invariant when one applies a diffeomorphism to a relativistic spacetime; it is the
family of physical facts the spacetime represents. (This line of thought already strongly suggests that
the debate between substantivalists and relationalists is not well posed.) One may represent those
facts in a language some of whose primitive terms designate “spacetime points” or not. Further,
one may want to restrict the attribution of existence to what has intrinsic physical significance in
13Op. cit.
14This is not to say that I consider the choice of a Lagrangian or a symplectomorphic presentation of phase space
to be the choice of a Carnapian linguistic framework, only that the sorts of considerations that go into each choice
are similar.
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the context of our best physical theories. Then again, one may not. It is irrelevant to our capacity
to use them in profitable ways in science and, more important, to our comprehension of those facts
and our understanding of the role they play in our broader attempts to comprehend the physical
world.
In the end, however, the most serious problem I have with the Hole Argument, and all other
arguments analogous to it, comes to this: nothing I can see militates in favor of taking the Hole
Argument as bearing on the ontic status of spacetime points, just because the Hole argument by
itself provides no independent, clear and precise criterion for what “existence independent of metrical
structure” comes to. That idea has no substantive content on its own. In the next two sections, I will
show this by exhibiting two plausible, precise criteria for what the idea may mean in the contexts
of two different types of investigation, which in the event lead respectively to opposed conclusions.
3 Limits of Spacetimes
In this section, I propose an argument in favor of the view that one cannot identify spacetime points
in the absence of metrical structure, and so, a fortiori, that one cannot attribute to the spacetime
manifold any existence independent of that structure; the provision of a precise criterion for the
existence of spacetime structure, grounded in both the structure and the application of physical
theory, drives the argument. In the event, two criteria natural to the investigative context will
suggest themselves, a weaker one based on the idea of the identifiability of spacetime points and a
stronger one based on their existence (in a precise sense).
To treat a spacetime as the limit, in some sense, of an ancestral family of continuously changing
spacetimes is one of the ways of embodying in the framework of general relativity two of the most
fundamental and indispensable tools in the physicist’s workshop: the idealization of a system by
means of the suppression of complexity, so as to render the system more tractable to investigation;
and the enrichment of a system’s representation in a theory by the addition (or reimposition) of
complexity previously ignored (or ellided) in the model the theory provides for the system. As a
general rule, the fewer degrees of freedom a system has, the easier it becomes to study. Schwarzschild
spacetime (figure 1) is far easier to work with than Reissner-Nordstro¨m (figure 2) in large part be-
cause one ignores electric charge, and there is a natural sense in which one can think of Schwarzschild
spacetime as the limit of Reissner-Nordstro¨m as the electric charge of the central black hole decreases
in magnitude to zero.15 Contrarily, as a general rule the more degrees of freedom one includes in
a system’s model, the more phenomena that the system manifests the model can represent, and
with greater accuracy (or at least fineness of detail). A generic representation of such a limiting
process can provide a schema of both of these theoretical tools respectively, depending on whether
15Schwarzschild spacetime is the unique spherically symmetric vacuum solution to the Einstein field equation (other
than Minkowski spacetime); it represents a spacetime that is empty except for an electrically neutral, spherically
symmetric, static central body or black hole of a fixed mass. Reissner-Nordstro¨m is the generalization of Schwarzschild
spacetime that allows the central structure to have an electric charge. See, e.g., Hawking and Ellis (1973, ch.5, §5)
for an exposition.
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Figure 1: Carter-Penrose diagram of Schwarzschild spacetime. Each point in the diagram represents
a 2-sphere in the spacetime manifold. (This diagram is taken from Geroch 1969, with the author’s
permission.)
Figure 2: Carter-Penrose diagram of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetime. Each point in the diagram
represents a 2-sphere in the spacetime manifold. (This diagram is taken from Geroch 1969, with the
author’s permission.)
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one enlarges or shrinks the number of degrees of freedom in the limiting process. As we will see,
what in the idealized model one may reasonably identify and attribute existence to may depend
in sensitive ways on the character of the more complex or simpler models one starts from and the
nature of the limiting process itself. This fact drives the argument I propose. I will first discuss in
some detail two examples of such a limiting process in order to motivate the two precise criteria I
propose for the existence of spacetime points independent of metrical structure.
Before diving into the examples, however, I first characterize in the abstract the limiting process
itself. I use the construction of Geroch (1969) (whose exposition I closely follow), which I only
sketch, to capture it. (I simplify his construction in non-essential ways for our purposes, and gloss
over unnecessary technicalities.) Consider a 1-parameter family of relativistic spacetimes, by which
I mean a family {(Mλ, gab(λ))}λ∈(0,1], where each (Mλ, gab(λ)) is a relativistic spacetime with
signature (+, −, −, −) for gab(λ). (It will be clear in a moment why I work with the contravariant
form of the metric tensor.) In particular, I do not assume that Mλ is diffeomorphic to Mλ′ for
λ 6= λ′. The problem is to find a limit of this family, in some suitable sense, as λ → 0. To solve
the problem in full generality, we will use a geometrical construction, gluing the manifolds Mλ of
the family together to form a 5-dimensional manifold M, so that each Mλ is itself a 4-dimensional
submanifold of M in such a way that the collection of all of them foliate M.16 λ becomes a scalar
field on M, and the metrics gab(λ) on each submanifold fit together to form a tensor field gAB on M,
of signature (0, +, −, −, −). (I use majuscule indices for objects on M.) The gradient of λ on M
determines the singular part of gAB : gAN∇Nλ = 0. (This is why I work with the contravariant form
of the metric; otherwise, we could not contravect its five-dimensional parent in any natural way with
the gradient of λ.) Note that gAB by itself already determines the submanifolds Mλ (viz., as the
surfaces defined by gAN∇Nλ = 0), and that it does so in a way that does not fix any identification
of points among them. In other words, the structure I posit does not allow one to say that a point in
Mλ is “the same point in spacetime” as a point in a different Mλ′ (as I shall discuss at some length
below).
To define a limit of the family now reduces to the problem of the attachment of a suitable bound-
ary to M “at λ = 0”. A limiting envelopment for M, then, is an ordered quadruplet (Mˆ, gˆAB , λˆ, Ψ),
where Mˆ is a 5-dimensional manifold with paracompact, Hausdorff, connected and non-trivial bound-
ary ∂Mˆ, gˆAB a tensor field on Mˆ, λˆ a scalar field on Mˆ taking values in [0, 1], and Ψ a diffeomorphism
of M to the interior of Mˆ, all such that
1. Ψ takes gAB to gˆAB (i.e., Ψ is an isometry) and takes λ to λˆ
2. ∂Mˆ is the region defined by λˆ = 0
3. gˆAB has signature (0, +, −, −, −) on ∂Mˆ
This makes precise the sense in which Mˆ represents M with a boundary attached in such a way
that the metric on the boundary (gˆAB restricted to ∂Mˆ) can be naturally identified as a limit of the
16In general what will result is not a foliation in the strict sense of differential topology, but will rather be a stratified
space (Thom 1969). It is close enough to a foliation, however, to warrant using the more familiar term for simplicity
of exposition.
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metrics on the Mλ (g
AB on M). I call {(Mλ, gab(λ))}λ∈(0,1] an ancestral family of the spacetime
represented by ∂Mˆ, and I call ∂Mˆ the limit space of the family with respect to the given envelopment.
In general, a given spacetime will have many ancestral families, and an ancestral family will have
many different limit spaces. For the sake of convenience I will often not distinguish between M and
the interior of Mˆ. (Although it is tempting also to abbreviate ‘∂Mˆ’ by ‘M0’, I will not do so, because
part of the point of the construction is that different spacetimes can have the same ancestral family.)
Before giving an example of the construction and putting it to work, I discuss one of its features,
that it parametrizes not only the metrics but also the spacetime manifolds themselves. Geroch
(1969, p. 181) himself states in illuminating terms the reason behind this.
It might be asked at this point why we do not simply take the gab(λ) as a 1-parameter
family of metrics on a given fixed manifold M. Such a formulation would certainly
simplify the problem: it amounts to a specification of when two points pλ ∈ Mλ′ and
pλ′ ∈Mλ (λ 6= λ′) are to be considered as representing “the same point” of M. It is not
appropriate to provide this additional information, for it always involves singling out a
particular limit, while we are interested in the general problem of finding all limits and
studying their properties.
To make the force of these remarks clear, consider the attempt to take the limit of Schwarzschild
spacetime as the central mass goes to 0. In Schwarzschild coordinates, using the parameter λ ≡
M−1/3 (the inverse-third root of the Schwarzschild mass), the metric takes the form(
1− 2
λ3r
)
dt2 −
(
1− 2
λ3r
)−1
dr2 − r2(dθ2 + sin2 θdφ2) (3.1)
This clearly has no well defined limit as λ→ 0. Now, apply the coordinate transformation
r˜ ≡ λr, t˜ ≡ λ−1t, ρ˜ ≡ λ−1θ
In these coordinates, the metric takes the form(
λ2 − 2
r˜
)
dt˜2 −
(
λ2 − 2
r˜
)−1
dr˜2 − r˜2(dρ˜2 + λ−2 sin2(λρ˜)dφ2)
The limit λ→ 0 exists and yields
−2
r˜
dt˜2 +
r˜
2
dr˜2 − r˜2(dρ˜2 + ρ˜2dφ2)
a flat solution discovered by Kasner (1921). If instead of that coordinate transformation we apply
the following to the original Schwarzschild form (3.1),
x ≡ r + λ−4, ρ ≡ λ−4θ
then the resulting form also has a well defined limit, which is the Minkowski metric. The two limiting
processes yield different spacetimes because it happens behind the scenes that “the same points of
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the underlying manifold get pushed around relative to each other in different ways”. Because the
coordinate relations of initially nearby points differ in different coordinate systems, those differences
get magnified in the limit, so that their final metrical relations differ. Thus, the limits in the different
coordinates yield different metrics.17
In the language I introduced above, we should say that the difference between the two limits
consists in the different identifications each makes among the points of different Mλ. That is why
it is inappropriate to work with a fixed manifold from the start. To do so determines a unique
limit, but we want to allow ourselves different ways to take the limit, so that our ideal scientist can
ignore different facets of the complex system under study, and so produce different idealized models
of it.18 For example, she may want to take the limit of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetime as the mass
goes to zero while leaving the electric charge fixed rather than taking the limit as the electric charge
vanishes, or she may want to take the limit in a way that does not respect the spherical symmetry
of the initial system in order, e.g., to study small perturbations of the original system.
To characterize the metrical structure of the limit space using structure of members of the
ancestral family, I introduce one more construction. An orthonormal tetrad ξ(λ) at a point pλ ∈Mλ
is a collection of 4 tangent vectors at the point mutually orthogonal with respect to gab(λ). Let γ
be a smooth curve on M nowhere tangent to any Mλ such that it intersects each exactly once. γ
then is composed of a set of points pλ ∈Mλ, one for each λ. A family of frames along γ is a family
of orthonormal tetrads, one at each point of the curve such that each vector in the tetrad is tangent
to its associated Mλ, whose members vary smoothly along it. In general, a family of frames will
have no well defined limit in Mˆ as λ→ 0, i.e., there will be no tetrad ξ(0) at a point of ∂Mˆ that the
family ξ(λ) converges to; in this case, I say the family is degenerate. It is always possible, however,
given a tetrad ξ(0) at a point on the boundary to find some family of frames that does converge to
it.
Now, fix ξ(0) at p0 ∈ ∂Mˆ and a family of frames ξ(λ) that converges to it. We can represent
the metric tensor gab(λ) in a normal neighborhood of pλ in Mλ using the normal coordinate system
that ξ(λ) defines in the neighborhood. In a normal neighborhood of p0, the components of the
metric with respect to these coordinates converge as λ → 0, and the limiting numbers are just the
components of gab(0) at p0 with respect to the normal coordinates that ξ(0) defines. In this way,
we can characterize all structure on the limit space based on the behavior of the corresponding
structures along the family of frames in the ancestral family.
We are finally in a position to use this machinery to construct concrete examples. Consider a
family {(Mλ, gab(λ))} of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetimes each element of the family having the same
fixed value M for its mass and all parametrized by their respective electric charges λ, which converge
17Paiva, Rebouc¸as, and MacCallum (1993) discuss in some detail an interesting class of different limiting spacetimes
one can induce from Schwarzschild spacetime by taking the limit as the mass goes to zero and to infinity in different
ways. See Bengtsson, Holst, and Jakobsson (2014) for a similar discussion for Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetime, as the
electric charge and the mass respectively are taken to zero.
18Of course, sometimes is is appropriate for the scientist to take the limit of a family of metrics on a fixed background
manifold. An excellent example is in the statement and proof of the geodesic theorem of Ehlers and Geroch (2004).
In fact, they give an illuminating discussion of this very issue on p. 233.
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smoothly to 0.19 Construct their envelopment. One can now impose a natural collection of families
of frames on the family, with the limit space being Schwarzschild spacetime.20 Now, comparison of
figures 1 and 2 suggests that something drastic happens in the limit. All the points in the throat
of the Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetimes (the shaded region in the diagram) seem to get swallowed by
the central singularity in Schwarzschild spacetime—in some way or other, they vanish. Using our
machinery we can make precise the question of their behavior in the limit λ→ 0 in the envelopment.
Consider the points in the shaded region in figure 2, between the lines r = 0 and r = r−. (r is
the radial coordinate in a system that respects the spacetime’s spherical symmetry; the coordinate
values r− and r+ define boundaries of physical significance in the spacetime, which in large part serve
to characterize the central region of the spacetime as a black hole.) Fix a natural family of frames
along a curve in M composed of points qλ each of which lies in the shaded region in its respective
spacetime. It is straightforward to verify that the family of frames along the curve does not have
a well defined limit: roughly speaking, the curve runs into the Schwarzschild singularity at r = 0.
In this sense, no point in Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetime to the future of the horizon r = r− has a
corresponding point in the limit space. To sum up: one begins with a family of Reissner-Nordstro¨m
spacetimes continuously parametrized by electric charge, which converges to 0, and constructs the
envelopment of the family; one constructs the limit space by a choice of families of frames; the
collection of families of frames enforces an identification of points among different members of the
family of spacetimes, including a division of those points that have a limit from those that do not;
and that identification, in turn, dictates the identification of spacetime points in the limit space
(which points in the ancestral family lie within the Schwarzschild radius, e.g., and which do not).
Thus one can identify points within the limit Schwarzschild spacetime, one’s idealized model, only
by reference to the metrical structure of members of the ancestral family; one can, moreover, identify
points in the limit space with points in the more complex, initial models one is idealizing only by
reference to the metrical structure of the members of the ancestral family as well. It is only by the
latter identification, however, that one can construe the limit space as an idealized model of one’s
initial models, for the whole point is to simplify the reckoning of the physical behavior of systems
in particular spatiotemporal regions of one’s initial models, and most of all at individual spacetime
points of one’s initial models.
One can, moreover, use different families of natural frames to construct Schwarzschild spacetime
from the same ancestral family, with the result that in each case the same point of Schwarzschild
spacetime is identified with a different family of points in the ancestral family. More generally,
different families of frames will yield limit spaces different from Schwarzschild spacetime, with no
canonical way to identify a point in one limit space (one idealized model the theoretician constructs)
with one in another. In other words, the identification of points in the limit space depends sensitively
19I ignore the fact that electric charge is a discrete quantity in the real world, an appropriate idealization in this
context.
20The frames are natural in the sense that they conform to and respect the spherical and the timelike symmetries
in all the spacetimes. One could use this fact to explicate the claim that Schwarzschild spacetime is the canonical
limit of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetime, in the sense that it is what one expects on physical grounds, whatever exactly
that may come to, in the limit of vanishing charge while leaving all else about the spacetime fixed.
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on the way the limit is taken, i.e., on the way the model is constructed. In consequence, in so
far as one conceives of Schwarzschild spacetime as an idealized model of a richer, more complete
representation, one can identify points in it only by reference to the metrical structure of one of its
ancestral families, and one can do that in a variety of ways.
Now, say one wants to treat slightly aspherical, almost Schwarzschildian spacetimes as a com-
plexification of Minkowski spacetime, in order to study how asphericities affect metrical behavior.21
Because the limit spacetime will be almost Schwarzschildian, its appropriate manifold is still R2×S2,
the natural topology of Schwarzschild spacetime. In this case, in one intuitive sense points will “ap-
pear”, because the topology of Minkowski spacetime is R4, so in some sense one must “compactify
two topological dimensions” to derive a Schwarzschildian spacetime as a more complex limit. There
are many ways to effect such a compactification; all the simplest, such as Alexandrov compactifica-
tion, work by the addition of an extra point or set of points to the topological manifold to represent,
intuitively speaking, the bringing in of points at infinity to a manageable distance from everything
else.22 The difficulty of these issues, however, is underscored by the fact that one can also think of
this as a case in which points rather disappear : R2×S2, after all, is homeomorphic to R4 with a line
removed! Thus one could use an ancestral family every member of which is R4 but that has as limit
space the manifold of Schwarzschild spacetime presented as the manifold R4 with a line removed.23
In this example, we will consider the attempt to introduce a central, slightly aspherical body by
physical construction in a Minkowskian laboratory, as an experimentalist might do it. For the sake
of concreteness, let us say that our experimentalist will, in his representation of the experiment,
use an Alexandrov compactification of R4 to yield R2 × S2 as the presentation of the manifold of
the limit space. The physical construction will proceed in infinitesimal stages, with a tiny portion
of matter introduced at each step distributed in a slightly aspherical way (keeping, in an intuitive
sense, the aspherical shape of the body the same), and an allowance of a finite time to allow the
ambient metrical structure to settle down to an almost Schwarzschildian character before the next
step is initiated, until the central body’s mass reaches the desired amount. (Intuitively, the finite
time period allows the metrical perturbations introduced by the movement of the matter in and its
distribution around the central body to radiate off to infinity.) One can represent this process with
a limiting ancestral family of Geroch’s type in a more or less obvious way, starting with Minkowski
spacetime, viz., the empty, flat laboratory, and each member of the ancestral family representing the
laboratory at a particular stage of the construction, when a bit more matter has been introduced
and the perturbations have settled down.
Now, consider at the beginning of the process a small patch of space in the laboratory not too far
21One ought not confuse the idea of complexification I employ here—the making of a model more complex by
the introduction of new representational structure—with the idea bandied about in other contexts in mathematical
physics often also called ‘complexification’, in which one takes a mathematical structure based on the real numbers
and extends it to one based on the complex numbers.
22See, e.g., Kelley (1955) for an account of methods of compactification, including the Alexandrov type.
23This is a concrete instance where thinking of two different diffeomorphic presentations of the same manifold—in
this case, R2 × S2 and R4 with a line removed—as different manifolds leads to obvious difficulties, if not downright
confusions.
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from the position where the central body will be constructed. We want to try to track, as it were,
the spacetime points in that patch during the enlargement of the central body because we plan to
investigate, say, how the metrical structure in regions at that spatiotemporal remove from a central
aspherical body differ from each other for different masses of the central body. (Because the Einstein
field equation is nonlinear, and there is no exact symmetry, one cannot just assume that slightly
aspherical spacetimes will scale in any straightforward way with increases in the central mass.) There
are several ways one might go about trying to track the region as the construction progresses. One
obvious, simple way is by the triangulation of distances from some “fixed” markers in the laboratory.
Because the metrical structure within the lab is constantly changing, however, and doing so in very
complex ways during the periods when new matter is being introduced and distributed, and the
concomitant metrical perturbations are radiating away, there is no canonical way of implementing
the triangulation procedures; in fact, the different ways of doing so are exactly captured by the
different families of frames one can fix to identify points among the members of the ancestral family
of spacetimes (which in this case, recall, now respectively represent the spacetime region enclosed
by the laboratory at different stages of the construction of the central body). According to some
of the concrete implementations of the triangulation procedure, i.e., according to different families
of frames one uses to identify points among the several members of the ancestral family, the patch
one tries to track will end up inside the central body; according to other procedures, it will end up
outside the central body. In consequence, what one means by “the set of spacetime points composing
a small region at a fixed spatiotemporal position relative to the central body” will depend sensitively
on how one fixes and tracks relative spatiotemporal positions, which is to say, depends sensitively
on one’s knowledge of the spacetime’s metrical structure.24
We are finally in a position to offer a precise criterion for “existence of spacetime points inde-
pendent of metrical structure” natural to the investigative contexts we have considered. There are
in fact two natural criteria that suggest themselves, one weaker than the other. The first, suggested
by the example of complexification and stated somewhat loosely, is
Definition 3.1 Points in a spacetime manifold have existence independent of metrical structure
if there is a canonical method to identify spacetime points during gradual modifications to the local
spacetime structure.
My discussion of the example of complexification shows that, in this context and using this criterion,
spacetime points do not have existence independent of metrical structure.
24One might object that, in this example, the experimentalist is really trying to track “the same points through
space over time”, not “the same spatiotemporal points in different spacetimes”. In fact, though, since the goal of the
investigation is to determine how global metrical structure in slightly aspherical spacetimes differ for different values
of the central mass, it is natural for the experimentalist to consider each static phase of the laboratory—the period
after the last bit of mass has been added and the perturbations have settled down, but before the next bit of mass
is added—as a separate spacetime in its own right, for the purposes of comparison. An appropriate analogue is the
so-called “physical process” version of the First Law of black-hole mechanics (Wald and Gao 2001, Wald 1994), where
one must identify two separate spacetimes (in the sense of two different solutions to the Einstein field equation) that
differ in that one conceives of the one as the result of a dynamical evolution of the other, even though there is no
concrete representation of that evolution as occurring in a single spacetime.
19
Now, based on the discussion of simplification, I propose a second criterion, stronger than the
first and formulated more precisely and rigorously. Fix an envelopment of a limiting family with a
definite limit space. I say that a point inM1 with an associated degenerate family of frames vanishes
(or that the point itself is a vanishing point) with respect to the given family of frames. I say that
a point in ∂Mˆ appears if there is no family of frames that converges to it.
Definition 3.2 Points in a spacetime manifold have existence independent of metrical structure
if no specification of a family of frames in any ancestral family of the spacetime has vanishing or
appearing points.
I do not demand that one be able to identify in a preferred way a spacetime point in the limit with
any point of any member of one of its ancestral families, much less for all its ancestral families; this
allows us to hold on to diffeomorphic freedom in the presentation of the limit space. I do not even
demand that the criterion hold for every possible spacetime model—perhaps in some spacetimes it
makes sense to attribute existence to spacetime points independent of metrical structure, whereas
in others (say, completely homogeneous spacetimes) it does not. I demand only that, for a given
spacetime, one not be able to make points in any of its ancestral families vanish and not be able
to make points in it, as the limit space, appear. This attempts to capture the idea that, when we
construct a spacetime model and treat it as an idealized representation of a more complex system—
as it always is—then we can reliably identify spacetime points in our model with points in the more
complex system, albeit up to diffeomorphic presentation. If we cannot do this irrespective of the
more complex model we start from, then we cannot without arbitrariness and artifice regard results
of an investigation in the context of the idealized model as relevant to the physics of the more
complex system, for we will be unable to identify the regions in the more complex system that the
results of the idealizing investigation pertain to. The example of Schwarzschild spacetime as a limit
of a family of Reissner-Nordstro¨m spacetimes clearly does not satisfy the criterion, for there are
points that vanish in the limiting procedure (e.g., those in the shaded region of figure 2). One may
suspect that the existence of singular structure in the two spacetimes fouls things up. The following
result, however, establishes that no spacetime satisfies the criterion, i.e., that its failure is universal
and depends on no special properties of any spacetime model.
Every spacetime has at least one ancestral family, the trivial one consisting of the continuous
sequence of itself, so to speak. Construct an envelopment M for it, with it itself as the limit space,
and apply a slight twist, so to speak, to every metric in every model in the family so as to render
each model non-isometric to any other, i.e., so as to render the family non-trivial. (One can make
this idea precise in any of a number of simple ways, such as using a smoothly varying 1-parameter
family of linear perturbations.) On a curve in M, fix a family of frames that has a well defined limit
on ∂Mˆ. Now, define a family of Lorentz transformations along that curve, one transformation at
each point, such that the family varies smoothly along the curve, and such that when one applies
each transformation to the tetrad at its point, the result is a family of frames that has no well defined
limit. (One can always do this; for example, the Lorentz transformations can cause the tetrads to
oscillate wildly as λ→ 0.) The points of the ancestral family along that curve have no corresponding
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point in the limit space defined by the resulting family of frames. This proves
Proposition 3.3 Every spacetime has a non-trivial ancestral family with vanishing points. Every
non-trivial ancestral family has a limit space with respect to which some of its points vanish.
In consequence, in every relativistic spacetime we treat as an idealized model in the context of this
sort of scientific investigation, we can attribute existence to individual spacetime points (or not),
only by reference to the metrical structure of the ancestral family we use to construct the model,
and the limiting process we choose for the construction.
An obvious objection to the relevance of these arguments to the ontic status of spacetime points
is that I deal here only with idealizations and approximations, not with “a real model of real
spacetime”. But we never work with anything that is not an idealization—it’s idealizations all the
way down, young man, as part of the human condition. If you can’t show me how to argue for the
existence of spacetime points independently of metrical structure using our best scientific theories
as they are actually used in successful practice, then you are not relying on real science to ground
your arguments. You are paying only lip-service to the idea that science should ground these sorts
of metaphysical issues.
4 Pointless Constructions
The argument of §3 yields a conclusion that holds only in a limited sphere, viz., those investigations
based on the idealization of models of spacetime by means of limits. One may wonder whether it
could be parlayed into a more general argument. I do not think so. Indeed, I think there is no sound
argument to the effect that no matter the context of the investigation one can identify spacetime
points or attribute existence to them only by reference to prior metrical structure. Sometimes, in
some contexts, one can attribute existence to them and identify them without any such reference.
To show this, I will present an argument that all the structure accruing to a spacetime, considered
simply as a differential manifold that represents the collection of all possible (or, depending on one’s
modal predilections, actual) physical events, can be given definition with clear physical content in the
absence of metrical structure. The argument takes the form of the construction of the point-manifold
of a spacetime, its topology, its differential structure and all tensor bundles over it from a collection
of primitive objects that, when the construction is complete, acquires a natural interpretation as a
family of covering charts from the manifold’s atlas, along with the families of bounded, continuous
scalar fields on the domain of each chart. That idea yields the following precise criterion the argument
will rely on.
Definition 4.1 Points in a spacetime manifold have existence independent of metrical structure if
the manifold can be constructed from a family of scalar fields, the values of which can be empirically
determined without knowledge of metrical structure.
The basic idea of the construction is simple. I posit a class of sets of rational numbers to repre-
sent the possible values of physical fields, with a bit of additional structure in the form of primitive
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relations among them just strong enough to ground the definition of a derived relation whose natural
interpretation is “lives at the same point of spacetime as”. A point of spacetime, then, consists of an
equivalence class of the derived relation. The derived relation, moreover, provides just enough rope
to allow for the definition of a topology and a differential structure on the family of all equivalence
classes, and from this the definition of all tensor bundles over the resultant manifold, completing
the construction. The posited primitive and derived relations have a straightforward physical in-
terpretation, as the designators of instances of a schematic representation of a fundamental type of
procedure the experimental physicist performs on physical fields when he attempts to ascertain rela-
tions of physical proximity and superposition among their observed values. An important example
of such an experimental procedure is his use of the observed values of physical quantities associated
with experimental apparatus to determine the values of quantities associated with other systems,
those he investigates by use of the apparatus. This interpretation of the relations motivates the
claim that the constructed structure suffices, for our purposes, as a representation of spacetime in
the context of a particular type of experimental investigation as modeled by mathematical physics,
and is not (only) an abstract mathematical toy.
I begin the construction by laying down some definitions. Let Q be the set of rational numbers.
A simple pointless field φ (or just simple field) is a disjoint union
⊎
p∈Q4
fp, indexed by the set Q4,
such that
1. every fp ∈ Q
2. there is an fp ∈ φ for every p ∈ Q4
3. there are two strictly positive numbers Bl and Bu such that Bl < |fp| < Bu for all p ∈ Q4
4. the function φ¯ : Q4 → Q defined by φ¯(p) = fp is continuous in the natural topologies on those
spaces, except perhaps across a finite number of compact three-dimensional boundaries in Q4
Our eventual interpretation of such a thing as a candidate result for an experimentalist’s determi-
nation of the values for a physical field motivates the set of conditions. That we index φ over Q4
means that we assume from the start that the experimentalist by the use of actual measurements
and observations alone can impose on spacetime at most the structure of a countable lattice indexed
by quadruplets of rational numbers (and even this only in a highly idealized sense); in other words,
the spatiotemporal precision of measurements is limited. Condition 1 says that all measurements
have only a finite precision in the determination of the field’s value. Condition 2 says that the field
the experimentalist measures has a definite value at every point of spacetime. Condition 3 says that
there is an upper and a lower limit to the magnitude of values the experimentalist can attribute
to the field using the proposed experimental apparatus and technique; for instance, any device for
the measurement of the energy of a system has only a finite precision, and thus can attribute only
absolute values greater than a certain magnitude, and the device will be unable to cope with en-
ergies above a given magnitude. Condition 4 tries to capture the ideas that (local) experiments
involve only a finite number of bounded physical systems (apparatuses and objects of study), and
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that classical physical systems bear physical quantities the magnitudes of which vary continously (if
not more smoothly), except perhaps across the boundaries of the systems.
Fix a family Φ of simple pointless fields. The link at p, λp, is a set containing exactly one
element from each simple field in Φ such that all the elements are indexed by p, the same quadruplet
of rational numbers. One link, for example, consists of the set of all values in the fields in Φ indexed
by (3/17, 2, −3001 9091 , 2). A linked family of simple pointless fields F is an ordered pair (Φ, Λ) where
Φ is a countable collection of simple fields, and Λ is the family of links on Φ, a linkage, complete in
the sense that it contains exactly one link for each p ∈ Q4. The idea is that the values of the simple
fields in the same link all live “at the same point of spacetime”, namely that designated by p. One
can think of the linkage as a coordinate system on an underlying, abstract point set.
We are almost ready to define the point-structure of the spacetime manifold. We require only
two more constructions, which I give in an abbreviated fashion so as to convey the main points
without getting bogged down in unnecessary technical detail. Let F = (Φ, Λ) be a linked family
containing all simple fields; we call it a simple fundamental family. Let Fˆ = (Φˆ, Λˆ) be another.
We want a way to relate the linkages of the two, so as to be able to represent the relation between
the coordinate systems of two different charts on the same neighborhood of the spacetime manifold,
or on the intersection of two neighborhoods. A cross-linkage on a simple fundamental family is an
ordered triplet (O, Oˆ, χ) where O ⊆ Q4 and Oˆ ⊆ Q4 are open sets, such that either both are the null
set or else both are homeomorphic to Q4, and χ is a homeomorphism of O to Oˆ. The link λp ∈ Λ
for p ∈ O, then, will designate the same point in the underlying manifold as λˆχ(p) ∈ Λˆ for χ(p) ∈ Oˆ;
in this case, we say the links touch. If O and Oˆ are the null set, then the represented neighborhoods
do not intersect. (We do not require that the values of the scalar fields in the two different simple
fundamental families be numerically equal at any given point, as the two scalar fields may represent
different physical quantities, e.g., a component of the fluid velocity and a component of the shear-
stress tensor of a viscous fluid.) One can extend the idea of a cross-linkage to an arbitrary number
of simple fundamental families in the obvious way. (To make the idea precise we would need to
index the collection of families, and so on, but I think it is clear enough without going through the
bother.) We would then identify a point in an underlying abstract point-set as an equivalence class
of links under the equivalence relation “touches”.
To finish the preparatory work, we must move from rationals to reals. Fix a simple, fundamental
family F. First, we attribute to F the algebraic structure of a module over Q. For example, the sum
of two simple pointless fields φ and ψ in Φ is a simple pointless field ξ such that xp ≡ fp + gp is
the value in ξ labeled by the index p, where fp ∈ φ and gp ∈ ψ. ξ is clearly itself a simple pointless
field with a natural embedding in the linkage on F, and so belongs to Φ. Now, roughly speaking,
we take a double Cauchy-like completion of Φ over both the points p ∈ Q4 and the values fpˆ ∈ Q,
yielding the family Φ¯ of all disjoint unions of real numbers continuously indexed by quadruplets of
real numbers.25 This procedure makes sense, because every continuous real scalar field on R4 is,
25In order to get the completion we require, standard Cauchy convergence does not in fact suffice. We must rather
use a more general method, such as Moore-Smith convergence based on topological nets. The technical details are
not important. See, e.g., Kelley (1955, ch. 2) for details.
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again roughly speaking, the limit of some sequence of bounded, continuous rational fields defined on
Q4. We thus obtain what is in effect the family Φ¯ of all continuous real scalar fields on R4, though
I refer to them as pointless fields, in so far as, at this point, they are still only indexed disjoint
unions. The limiting procedure, moreover, induces on Φ¯ the structure of a module over R from that
on Φ. Finally, in the obvious way, we take the completion, as it were, of Λ using the same limiting
procedure to obtain a linkage Λ¯ on Φ¯. I call F¯ = (Φ¯, Λ¯) a fundamental family. A cross-linkage on
a pair of fundamental families is the same as for simple fundamental families, except only that one
uses homeomorphisms on subsets of R rather than Q. If we have two simple fundamental families
with a cross-linkage on them and take limits to yield two fundamental families, then the nature of
the limiting process guarantees a unique cross-linkage on the two fundamental families consistent
with the original.
We can at last construct a real topological manifold from a collection of simple fundamental
families. The basic idea is that a fundamental family represents the family of continuous real
functions on the interior of a bounded, normal neighborhood of what will be the spacetime manifold.
Because a spacetime manifold must be paracompact (otherwise it could not bear a Lorentz metric),
there is always a countable collection of such bounded, normal neighborhoods that cover it. This
suggests
Definition 4.2 A pointless topological manifold is an ordered pair ({Fi}i∈N, χ) consisting of a
countable set of simple fundamental families and a cross-linkage on them.
To justify the definition, I sketch the construction of the full point-manifold and its topology. First,
we take the joint limit of all simple fundamental families to yield a countable collection of fundamen-
tal families with the induced cross-linkage. A point in the manifold, then, is an equivalence class of
links, at most one link from each family, under the equivalence relation “touches”. The set of links
associated with one of the families, then, becomes a representation, with respect to the equivalence
relation, of the interior of a compact, normal neighborhood in the manifold, and the fields in that
family represent the collection of continous real functions on that neighborhood. The cross-linkage
defines the intersections among all these neighborhoods, yielding the entire point-set of the man-
ifold. By assumption, the collection of all such neighborhoods forms a sub-basis for the topology
of the manifold, and so, by constructing the unique topological basis from the given sub-basis, the
point-set becomes a true topological manifold. It is straightforward to verify, for example, that a
real scalar field on the constructed manifold is continuous if and only if its restriction to any of the
basic neighborhoods defines a field in the fundamental family associated with that neighborhood.
Now, to complete the construction, we can define the manifold’s differential structure in a
straightforward way using similar techniques. First, demarcate the family of smooth scalar fields
as a sub-set of the continuous ones, which one can do in any of a number straightforward ways
with clear physical content based on the idea of directional derivatives. The family of all smooth
scalar fields on a topological manifold, however, fixes its differential structure (Chevalley 1947). The
directional derivatives themselves suffice for the definition of the tangent bundle over the manifold,
and from that one obtains all tensor bundles.
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After so much abstruse and, worse, tedious technical material, we can now judge whether the
construction supports the argument I want to found on it. The use of Q4 to index a simple pointless
field represents the fact that all points in a laboratory have been uniquely labeled by 4 rational
numbers, say, by the use of rulers and stop-watches. Such an operation neither measures nor relies
on knowledge of metrical structure, for it yields in effect only a chart on that spacetime region. (No
assumption need be made about the “metrical goodness” of the rulers and clocks.) Neither does
any other operation used in the construction pertain to metrical structure. One determines the
values of the simple fields, for example, by use of physical observations, which do not themselves
necessarily depend on knowledge of the ambient metrical structure. To illustrate the idea, consider
the use of a gravity gradiometer to measure the components of the Riemann tensor in a region of
spacetime, which exemplifies many of the ideas in the construction. The gradiometer is essentially a
sophisticated torsion balance for measuring the quadrupole (and higher) moments of an acceleration
field.26 Its fixed center and the ends of its two rotatable axes continuously occupy at any given
moment 5 proximate points, the attribution to which of values for linear and angular acceleration
yields direct measures of the components of the Riemann tensor in a normal frame adapted to the
position and motion of the instrument. One then identifies the spacetime points the parts of the
instrument respectively occupy, and by extension those in the normal frame adapted to it, by the
values of the components of the Riemann tensor and their derivatives in that frame, by the values
of its scalar invariants, and so on.27 One does not have to postulate a prior metric structure in
order to perform the measurements and label the points, nor need one have already determined the
metrical structure by experiment. Indeed, in the performance of the gradiometer measurements one
determines much of spacetime’s metrical structure. Because the facts of intrinsic physical significance
that the values of the fields and the relations among them embody (is this body in contact with
another? does heat flow from that body to this or vice-versa?), moreover, remain invariant under the
action of a diffeomorphism it follows that the equivalence classes we used to construct points does so
as well. Thus, we can fix all the manifold structure, including metrical, only up to diffeomorphism,
as we expect. This shows that the construction delivers everything we need and nothing more.
There is an obvious response to the argument based on this construction. One may object that,
so far from the argument’s having shown that the construction pushes us to attribute independent
existence to spacetime points, it rather suggests that points are defined only by reference to prior
physical systems, and hence exist in only a Pickwickian sense, dependent on the identifiability of
those physical systems. This objection can be answered by, as it were, throwing away the ladder.
Once one has the identification of spacetime points with equivalence classes of values of scalar fields,
one can as easily say that the points are the objects with primitive ontological significance, and the
physical systems are defined by the values of fields at those points, those values being attributes of
their associated points only per accidens.28 I do not pretend to endorse such a move, but I do not
26See, e.g., Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler 1973, §16.5, pp. 401–402, for a description of the device and its use.
27See, for example, Bergmann and Komar (1960, 1962) for a concrete, albeit purely formal, example of a procedure
for implementing this idea.
28Stachel (1993) provides an elegant tool for describing the result of such a construction as I propose and in particular
this rebuttal to the proposed objection (though I should say his work is not related to a project such as this). In his
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have to. My constructive argument is ad hominem.
5 The Debate between Substantivalists and Relationalists
I do not consider the idea of pointless manifolds deep or of great interest in its own right.29 There
are, I am sure, many other constructions in the same spirit. If one were so inclined, I suppose
one could try to take something like it to give a precise way for a relationalist to characterize the
spacetime manifold.30 I am not so inclined, because I do not think the contemporary debate between
the relationalist and the substantivalist has been well posed, and I am inclined to think it never will
be in any interesting sense. That is what I take to be the force of the opposed constructions of §3
and §4, taken in tandem. They show that “dependence on prior metrical structure” is formal, i.e.,
without substantive content until given explication in the framework of an investigative enterprise,
even if that framework be given only in schematic form. Once one grants this, however, the game
is up. Different investigative frameworks can and do yield natural criteria that lead to contrary
conclusions.31
An amusingly poignant feature of the constructions shows this clearly: each yields a conclusion
contrary to what the traditional debates would have led one to have expected based on the tools and
techniques it employs. In the second, one uses independent values of physical quantities (a stock in
trade of the relationalist) in order to identify and attribute existence to spacetime points without a
prior assumption of metric structure; and in the first, one uses structures in mathematical physics
that seem to presuppose the independent identifiability of spacetime points (a stock in trade of the
substantivalist) in order to argue that in fact they are not identifiable without a prior postulation
of metric structure. One may think that these features of the arguments make them, in the end,
self-defeating, but I do not think that is so. In the first, one operates under the implicit assumption
that the more complex models one idealizes are themselves only idealizations of yet more complex
models. In the second, one implicitly assumes that, say, the gradiometer is small enough and the
temporal interval of the measurement itself short enough to justify the use of the Minkowski metric in
making the initial attributions of the magnitudes of spatiotemporal intervals in the experiment; one
then uses this to bootstrap one’s way to a more accurate representation of the metrical structure of
spacetime, which is what is done in practice. I think that this facet of the arguments, perhaps more
than anything else, illustrates the vanity of the traditional debate: one can use the characteristic
resources and moves of each side to construct arguments contrary to it, once one takes the trouble
terms, I have sketched the construction of an individuating field independent of the stipulation of metrical structure,
viz., a field or system of fields on spacetime that suffices for the identification of individual spacetime points.
29There are a few questions of potential interest that accrue to it. Is it possible to determine the topology of a
non-compact manifold by the postulation of a finite number of simple fields? If so, does the minimum number depend
on a topological invariant? Is it in any case greater than the number of fields we currently believe to have physical
import?
30See Butterfield (1984) for a survey of some ways one might attempt such a project.
31This line of argument bears fruitful comparison to the ideas of Ruetsche (2011), though it was developed inde-
pendently of her work.
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to make the question precise.
Most damning in my eyes, the constructions show the futility of the debate, for they make explicit
how very little one gains in comprehension or understanding by having taken the considerable trouble
to have made the questions precise. Indeed, one may feel with justice that nothing has been gained,
but rather something has been lost in a pettifoggery of irrelevant technical detail.32
Although I conclude the traditional debate is without real content, I think there is a related,
interesting question one can give clear sense to: what in one’s investigative framework is naturally
taken to, or must one take to, have intrinsic physical significance? Even putting aside existence and
ontology as emotive distractions, however, I do not think one can give even this question substantive
sense in the abstract: the question is a formal template that one must give substance to by fixing
the significance of its terms in presumably different ways in different particular contexts.
Consider one way to rephrase the question that may seem on its face to give it concrete content
in abstraction from any schematic framework: what propositions would all observers agree on? One
cannot answer this question in the abstract, or even give it definite sense, because one has not yet
fixed the way that one will schematically represent the observer (or experimental apparatus) and
the process of observation. In order to do so, one must settle many questions of a more concrete
nature. Will one use the same theory to model the observation as one uses to model the system?
Will one take the observer to be a test system, in the sense that the values of its associated physical
quantities do not contribute to the initial-value formulation of the equations of motion of one’s
theoretical or experimental models? And so on. Until one settles such issues, one cannot even say
with precision what any single observer can or will observe, much more what all will agree on. In
this sense, even claims such as “in general relativity, only what is invariant under diffeomorphisms
has intrinsic physical significance” have only schematic content. One must give definite substance
to the “what” in “what is invariant”—substance that involves the forms of the physical systems at
issue and the methods available for their probing and representation—before one can make the claim
play any definite role in our attempts to comprehend the world. I take this to be the lesson of Stein
(1977), viz., that the way to proceed in these matters is the one Newton and Riemann relied on: we
must infer what we can about the spatiotemporal structure of the world from the roles it plays in
characterizing physical interactions; and on this basis, neither substantivalism nor relationalism can
claim any great victory.33
In the end, why should we ever have expected there to have been a single, canonical way to
explicate the physical significance of the idea of a spacetime point, on the basis of which we might
32Jeremy Butterfield in particular has vigorously tried to convince me that I dismiss too readily the possible
philosophical value of the technical constructions and arguments of §§3 and 4. I would like to think he is right.
33DiSalle (1994, p. 274) trenchantly makes a very closely related point, one, indeed, that in large part may be
viewed as foundational for my analysis:
Since the work of Riemann and Helmholtz, however (not to mention Einstein), it should be clear that
our claims about ‘objective’ spatiotemporal relations always involve assumptions about the physical
processes we use for measurement and stipulations about how those processes are to indicate aspects of
geometry.
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then attempt to determine whether such a thing exists or not in some lofty or mundane sense?
What, after all, is lost to our comprehension of the physical world without such a unique, canonical
explication? We purport after all, in these debates, to attempt to better comprehend the physical
world. Hadn’t we better ensure, then, that the terms of our arguments have the capacity to come in
some important way into contact with the physical world by way of experiment and theory? Once
we take that demand seriously, we find an orgiastic crowd of possible candidates to serve as concrete
realizations of the question, some of which will be fruitful in some kinds of enterprises, others in
others, and, most likely, several in none at all. Indeed, I am far from convinced that the question
of the existence of spacetime points has ever itself been well posed. I think a necessary (though
not sufficient) condition for the scientific cogency and relevance of that question is a demonstration
that an answer to it would contribute fruitfully to the proper comprehension of the performance of
an experiment or the proper construction of a model of a physical system in the context of general
relativity. (Recall this paper’s epigraph by Maxwell.) But what possible difference could an answer
to it make one way or another to those scientific issues?
I think there is a better question at hand: what mathematical structures “best” represent our
experience of spatiotemporal localization? Again, this question cannot be answered in the abstract,
for it depends sensitively on the answers to other, more or less independent and yet inextricable
questions, such as: what mathematical structures best represent our experience of other features
of spatiotemporal phenomena, such as the lack of absolute simultaneity, the orientability of space,
etc.? And also questions such as: what structures for representation of various kinds of derivatives
do we need to formulate equations of motion? And what structures for representation of Maxwell
fields? And so on. One has to attempt to address these questions in a dialectical fashion, answering
part of one here, seeing what adjustments that requires in other parts of the manifold of possible
structures, so to speak, and so on. The answer to one of these questions in one context may be
individual points of a spacetime manifold, to another question in another context it may be area and
volume operators as in loop quantum gravity, and so on. Instead of asking whether the manifold
itself or the manifold plus the metric is “really spacetime”, we should rather be asking what sorts
of structure with real physical significance a manifold by itself and a manifold with a metric can
respectively support—anything requiring only differential topology or geometry for the former, and
anything requiring Lorentzian geometry for the latter. It is to the investigation of such questions
that I now turn.
6 An Embarassment of Spacetime Structures
The arguments of this paper extend themselves naturally beyond the realm of the debate over the
existence of spacetime points, and do so in a way that sheds further light on the futility of that
debate. There are many different senses one can give to the question whether some putative entity
or structure of any type has real physical significance in the context of general relativity, each more
or less natural in different contexts. For lack of a better term, I shall say that an entity (which, as we
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shall see, can encompass several different types of thing), purportedly represented by a theoretical
structure, has physicality if one has a reason to take that structure seriously in a physical sense,
viz., if one can show that it plays an ineliminable, or at least fruitful and important, role in the way
that theory makes contact with experiment. Of course, as I stressed in §2, such an abstract, purely
formal schema as “plays an ineliminable, or at least fruitful and important, role in the way that
theory makes contact with experiment” has no real content until one explicates it in the context of
a more or less well delineated investigative framework. It is, in fact, one of the “important matters
on which sensible even if vague things can be said,” which Stein discussed in the passage I quoted
on page 3. As such, it is the examples that give the idea life.
6.1 Manifest Physicality
A Maxwell field, represented by the Faraday tensor Fab, is manifestly physical. One important sense
in which this is true turns on the fact that it contributes to the stress-energy tensor on the righthand
side of the Einstein field equation. The Maxwell field itself possesses stress-energy, and in general
relativity nothing is physical if not that.
Consider now a Killing field on spacetime, a vector field ξa that satisfies Killing’s equation
∇(a ξb) = 0 (6.1)
and so generates an isometry, in the sense that £ξ gab = 0. In this guise, it seems not to possess
the characteristics of a physical field, in so far as it enters the equations of motion of no manifestly
physical system, such as a Maxwell field. In other words, it does not couple with phenomena we
consider physical, does not contribute to the stress-energy tensor. Now, define the 2-index covariant
tensor Pab ≡ ∇a ξb. Equation (6.1) implies that it is anti-symmetric. Let us say that it happens
as well to have vanishing divergence and curl, ∇nPna = 0 and ∇[aPbc] = 0, and so satisfies the
source-free Maxwell equations. Is it eo ipso a true Maxwell field, and so physical? Not necessarily.
There are always an innumerable number of 2-forms on a spacetime that satisfy the source-free
Maxwell equations. At most, one of them represents a physical Maxwell field. If, however, it just
so happened that Pab were to represent the physical Maxwell field on spacetime—one known as
a Papapetrou field in this case—the fact that one natural way to represent the field happened to
generate an isometry would appear to be an accident, in the sense that no property of the field
accruing to it by dint of its physicality, which is to say, by dint of its satisfaction of the Maxwell
equations and concomitant coupling with other manifestly physical phenomena (such as spacetime
curvature, by way of the Einstein field equation), depends on the satisfaction of equation (6.1) by
ξa (except in the trivial sense that satisfaction of equation (6.1) is necessary for ξa to be a 4-vector
potential for a Maxwell field). Still, ξa is a naturally distinguished geometrical structure in the
physical description of spacetime, forms a part of the description of spacetime independent of the
particulars of the physical constitution of any observed phenomena, in particular in so far as it
places non-trivial contraints on a manifestly physical structure, the spacetime metric. In this sense,
different from that pertaining to the Maxwell field, ξa is physical, for the Maxwell field, by contrast,
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is not naturally distinguished in this sense, but rather depends in an essential way on the peculiar,
contingent physical constitution of a particular family of phenomena.
In what sense, though, is the metric manifestly physical? The metric does not itself contribute to
the stress-energy content of spacetime, for one cannot attribute a localized gravitational stress-energy
to it.34 That is not to say that the metric does not appear in the stress-energy tensor of a given
spacetime, for it is almost always required for the construction of the stress-energy tensor.35 The
stress-energy tensor of a Maxwell field, for example, is FanF
n
b +
1
4gabFrsF
rs. (The metric appears
not only explicitly in the second term, but also implicitly in both terms, raising the contracted
indices.) The metric, however, is necessary both for posing the initial-value formulation of every
possible kind of field that may appear in a relativistic spacetime, in particular all of those (such
as the Maxwell field) that we regard as manifestly physical, and for formulating the equations of
motion of the fields. In particular, the metric dynamically couples with other physical systems, i.e.,
enters into interaction with them in the strong sense that there always exist terms in the equations of
motion for any given field in which the metric appears as one factor and the tensor representation of
the field as another. For the Maxwell field, the metric appears contravected with the Faraday tensor
in the field equation representing the fact that its covariant divergence equals the charge-current
density of matter.36
The metric, of course, can play other roles as well, just as a Killing field. A vacuum spacetime with
non-zero cosmological constant has a stress-energy tensor equal to the metric times a constant. In this
case, one plausible way of reading the Einstein field equation is to have the metric play simultaneously
two distinct roles, one as the necessary ground of all spatiotemporal structure (embodied in the
Einstein tensor) and the other as a component in the tensor representing the stress-energy content
of spacetime, depending on contingent features of the ambient matter field, in this case, whatever
field gives rise to the cosmological constant. Again, in the former sense, as ground of spatiotemporal
structure, the metric is a naturally distinguished structure in any physical description of spacetime;
in the latter sense, it rather depends on the peculiar, contingent physical constitution of a particular
family of phenomena.
Consider the Riemann tensor. Again, it manifests physicality in several different ways, in different
contexts. Perhaps the most important is in the equation of geodesic deviation, where it directly
measures the rate at which infinitesimally neighboring geodesics tend to converge towards or diverge
away from each other. In this case, the Riemann tensor’s physicality consists in the fact that
it encodes all information needed to model manifestly observable phenomena, viz., the relative
acceleration of nearby freely falling particles and the tidal force exerted between different parts of a
34See, e.g., Curiel (2014b).
35Indeed, the only example I know of a stress-energy tensor for which the metric is not needed for its definition
is the case of a null gas, for which only the conformal structure of spacetime is required. See Lehmkuhl (2011) for
discussion of these issues.
36That the other defining equation for a Maxwell field, representing the fact that the Faraday tensor is curl-free,
does not require the metric at all for its formulation—the exterior derivative is determined by the differential structure
of the underlying manifold, and does not require any other structure at all for its definition—may push one to say
that it is not a dynamical equation of motion, but rather a kinematical constraint.
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freely falling extended body. Another important role it plays in general relativity is as the measure
of the failure of the ambient covariant derivative operator associated with the spacetime metric to
commute with itself when acting on vectors or tensors. Here, the physical interpretation is not
clear, but one way of trying to explicate it is by considering the way that a tangent vector changes
when parallel-propagated around an “infinitesimally small” loop.37 The infinitesimal change in the
vector when it returns to the initial point is directly proportional to the Riemann tensor. Still, it
is difficult to say that this has real physical significance, in so far as one could implement such a
mechanism and measure the result only in a spacetime with closed causal curves. And yet so much
of the mathematical apparatus of general relativity depends on the fact that the ambient derivative
operator is, in general, not flat (i.e., fails to commute with itself), that it would be absurd to say
that the Riemann tensor is not playing a physical role here. What exactly that role is, however, is
not easy to pin down. This is an example of the kind of philosophically important problem whose
resolution would have manifest physical significance that I take Maxwell to be referring to in the
passage I used as one of this paper’s epigraphs.
The Einstein tensor itself presents an interesting case. It has no straightforward geometrical
interpretation.38 It seems, moreover, to have no straightforward physical interpretation either—it
enters into the equations of motion of no known fields; it measures no quantitative feature of any
known physical phenomena; it does not represent a field possessing stress-energy; it constrains the
behavior of no other manifestly physical structure; and so on. And yet it is the structure that
matter fields couple to (via the Einstein field equation) in their role as source for spatiotemporal
curvature. In this role, it dynamically couples with no individual matter fields, but rather only
to the aggregate physical quantity “stress-energy” they all possess, and which, according to the
fundamental principle of the fungibility of all forms of energy,39 in no way differs qualitatively
among all known fields. Again, then, it seems manifestly physical in some sense, but it is difficult to
put one’s finger clearly on that sense, and, again, this is an example of a philosophically important
problem whose resolution would provide real physical insight.
Global structures of various sorts (causal, topological, projective, conformal, affine, et al.) present
interesting cases as well.40 Consider the conformal structure of a spacetime. It governs and is embod-
ied in the relative behavior of the null cones across all spacetime points. One natural interpretation
of the null cones is as determining a finite, unachievable upper-limit for the velocities of material
systems.41 The fact that the null cones determine a topological boundary for the chronological
37See Wald (1984, ch. 2, §3) for a thorough exposition.
38See Curiel (2014c, §2.1) for a discussion.
39See Maxwell (1877, ch. v, §97) and Maxwell (1888, chs. i, iii, iv, viii, xii) for illuminating discussion of this
principle.
40I take a structure to be global if it is not local in the sense explicated by Manchak (2009, p. 55):
[A] condition C on a spacetime is local if, given any two locally isometric spacetimes (M, gab) and
(M ′, g′ab), (M, gab) satisfies C if and only if (M
′, g′ab) satisfies C.
I think Manchak’s definition of “local” is superior, as judged by its physical significance in the context of general
relativity, to the one I proposed in Curiel (1999, §5), though the latter may still be of interest in purely mathematical
contexts, or in contexts of physical investigation that transcend the scope of a single theory.
41See, however, Geroch (2010) and Earman (2013) for dissenting arguments.
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future and past of every spacetime point also has a natural interpretation in the same vein: if the
chronological future or past were topologically closed, then there would be a limiting upper velocity
for massive bodies that would be actually achievable by a massive body using only a finite amount
of energy. If one accepts these interpretative glosses, then the conformal structure has physicality
in so far as it constrains the behavior of manifestly physical systems.
So, to sum up, the notions of physicality mooted here are:
• contributes to Tab (e.g., Maxwell field)
• required for initial-value formulation of manifestly physical fields (e.g., Maxwell field, gab)
• dynamically couples to manifestly physical entities (e.g., Maxwell field, gab)
• dynamically couples to manifestly physical quantities that more than one type of physical
system can bear (e.g., Einstein tensor)
• acts as a measure of an observable aspect of manifestly physical entities (e.g., Riemann tensor)
• enters the field equation of a manifestly physical structure (e.g., Einstein tensor)
• constrains the behavior of a manifestly physical entity (e.g., Killing field, conformal structure)
• plays an ineliminable, though physically obscure, role in the mathematical structure required
to formulate the theory (e.g., Riemann tensor, Einstein tensor)
I am confident there are yet more senses of physicality I have not touched upon.
6.2 Observability
One does not have to be an instrumentalist or an empiricist to accept that the possible observability
of physical phenomena is one of the most fundamental reasons we have to think such things are
physical in the first place. The question of the observability of various kinds of global structure in
general relativity, therefore, poses particularly interesting problems for arguments about physicality.
Manchak (2009, 2011) shows that, in a precise sense, local observations can never suffice to determine
the complete global structure of spacetime in general, and in particular cannot determine whether a
spacetime is inextendible or stably causal (Manchak 2011, p. 418, proposition 3). Nonetheless, there
remain several things to say and ask about the matter of physicality here.
Take, for example, the Euler number of the spacetime manifold, a global topological structure.42
It is a topological invariant that, in part, constrains the possible existence of everywhere non-zero
vector fields on a manifold. That an even-dimensional sphere, for example, possesses no everywhere
non-zero vector field (and indeed no Lorentzian metric) follows directly from the computation of
its Euler number. If we were to live in a world whose underlying manifold possessed a non-trivial
Euler number, and so could support no physical process that would manifest itself as an everywhere
42See, e.g., Alexandrov (1957, ch. viii).
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non-zero vector field, this would constitute a physical fact about the world in an indubitable sense.
It is not clear to me, however, whether in some precise sense the Euler number of the spacetime
manifold could ever be determined by direct observation.
The orientability of spacetime is an example of a global topological structure that seems to be
strictly inobservable in an intuitive sense. This follows from the fact that one can construct an
orientable manifold from any non-orientable one by lifting the structures on it to a suitable covering
space, which is automatically orientable. The lift of the spacetime metric to a covering manifold,
however, would yield a representation of exactly the same physical spacetime as the original: every
physical phenomena in the one has an isometric analogue, as it were, in the other, and vice-versa.
Whether or not a spacetime manifold is simply connected, moreover, seems to be in the same boat,
for the universal covering manifold of a manifold is guaranteed to be simply connected.43
Nonetheless, I think those answers about the possible observability of a manifold’s orientability
and simple connectedness may be too pat. If one were to observe that any member of a certain
family of closed, physically distinguished spatiotemporal loops could not be continuously deformed
into any member of another family of closed, physically distinguished spatiotemporal loops, one
would have shown that the spacetime manifold is not simply connected. Similarly, if one could
show that to parallely propagate a fixed orthonormal tetrad around a given closed spatiotemporal
loop would result in its inversion, one would have demonstrated that spacetime is not orientable. I
personally have no idea what sorts of experiment could show either of those things. The history of
physics, however, if it shows us nothing else, does show us never to underestimate the ingenuity of
experimentalists, no matter what the theoretician may tell them is impossible to observe or measure.
The first Betti number of the spacetime manifold offers another interesting example of this sort.
The first Betti number of a topological space is the number of distinct connected components it has;
any manifold with a first Betti number greater than one is ipso facto not connected. Say that we
posited a non-connected spacetime manifold. According to the principles of general relativity, any
phenomena in one component would be strictly inobservable in any other.44 By this criterion, it
makes no sense to attribute physicality to regions of spacetime disconnected from our own.
43In order for a manifold to possess a universal covering manifold, it must be semi-locally simply connected.
Intuitively, this means that it cannot contain “arbitrarily small holes”. More precisely, it means that every point
in the space has a neighborhood such that every loop in the neighborhood can be continuously contracted to a
point. (The contraction need not occur entirely with the given neighborhood.) The so-called Hawaiian Ear-Ring is
an example of a topological space that is not semi-locally simply connected (Biss 2000). Whether or not a spacetime
manifold is semi-locally simply connected presents us with yet another type of question related to physicality: strictly
speaking, there is no physical need for a manifold to possess a universal cover, and it is difficult, to say the least,
to see what other physical relevance being semi-locally simply connected could have; and yet the construction of the
universal cover is such an extraordinarily useful theoretical device (Geroch 1967) that one wants to demand that a
candidate spacetime manifold be semi-locally simply connected. What status does such a demand have? A purely
pragmatic one?
44Perhaps one could posit some form of quantum entanglement among phenomena in the different components.
The ramblings of many theorists of quantum gravity notwithstanding, such a possibility lies so far beyond the ambit
of current well entrenched experimental technique and well founded theoretical knowledge as to render it incompre-
hensible as physics. By the nature of the case, for instance, we could perform no direct experiments on the putatively
entangled phenomena in the postulated other component to verify the entanglement beyond a shadow of a doubt.
33
So, are these possibly inobservable global structures physical? Well, it seems to me that in one
sense they are, and in others they are not. The only lesson I want to draw here is that questions
of this sort require in-depth investigation sensitive both to the technical details of the mathematics
and to the physical details of how such structures may and may not bear on other phenomena we
think of as manifestly physical, even if they turn out to be indubitably inobservable.45
6.3 Physicality and Existence
What I have discussed so far in this section, I submit, are philophically rich, scientifically significant
questions and arguments, of the sort Maxwell mentions in the epigraph to this paper. Insight into
and progress on any of the questions would constitute real progress in our attempts to understand
the world in a scientific sense. The sterility of the current debate between substantivalists and
relationalists is shown in the fact that no questions it addresses has scientific value in the sense of
Maxwell—it has spurred no work with direct scientific, as opposed to purely metaphysical, import.
Still, No matter how convincing or interesting or philosophically rich these examples and argu-
ments may be, one might still want to respond that they show nothing about the possible existence
of spatiotemporal entities, and so in the end they do not bear on the debate between substantivalism
and relationalism. I do not think that is the correct lesson to leave with, though. I take physicality
to be a necessary condition for the attribution of existence to a theoretical entity. If there are many
possible ways an entity can manifest physicality, therefore, and one can show that different entities
manifest some but not others of them, then it follows that it is meaningless to attribute existence
simpliciter to such theoretical entities. If there are two entities each manifesting a different type of
physicality, then, in so far as each is a necessary condition for existence, if one attributes existence
to those entities, it must be of a different sort for each. Thus, in so far as one wants to make sense
of the idea of “existence” in the context of physical entities purportedly represented by theoretical
structures (if that is the sort of thing one likes to do), it cannot be univocal. To paraphrase Aristotle,
existence is said, if at all in physics, in many ways.
What light, if any, does all this shed on the cogency of the traditional debate about the ontic
status of spacetime? I think quite a bit. A spacetime point is not physical in any of the ways I
have explicated: there is no such thing as an initial-value problem for them; there is no equation of
motion for them; no property of theirs dynamically couples to any physical field; and so on. How,
then, is one supposed to try to answer the question of whether or not they exist in any way that
purports to be grounded in physics?
45The family of phenomena in relativistic spacetimes grouped under the rubric “singular stucture” (or “singulari-
ties”) provides on its own a rich and diverse selection of examples, which I do not have room even to sketch here. See
Curiel (1999) for an extended discussion.
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7 Valedictory Remarks on Realism and Instrumentalism, and
the Structure of Our Knowledge of Physics
I think my conclusions about the vanity of metaphysical argumentation abstracted from the prag-
matics of the scientific enterprise carry over into the general debate over realism and instrumentalism.
Indeed, I consider the argument about relationalism and substantivalism to be an instance of the
more general form of argument one can give for existence claims about entities and structures in
science. I will consider two examples to make the point, the first somewhat sophisticated, the second
quite simple.
Consider, first, the Unruh effect.46 The effect, roughly speaking, is as follows. (I discuss it
only in the context of a special case, but this does not affect the point.) Consider two observers
in Minkowski spacetime pervaded by a scalar quantum field in its vacuum state. Each observer
carries a simple particle-detector coupled to the field, with two states: an excited state (“particle
observed”), and a ground state (“particle not observed”). Both detectors are initially in the ground
state. The first observer follows a geodesic, and so does not accelerate; in this case, quantum field
theory predicts that the particle detector will remain in the ground state, i.e., the probability that
he will detect any particles is zero, as one would expect on physical grounds, since the background
field is in the vacuum state. The second observer, however, begins to accelerate. Now, there is a
high probability that her detector will change from the ground to the excited state; she will “see
particles”. That is the Unruh effect. Even though the two observers disagree on whether there are
particles or not, they both agree that the state of the second particle detector changes, so there is a
physical fact of the matter in that sense.47 Now, the bit of most interest to us is that the fluctuations
in the field that determine the change in the state of the detector do not contribute to the definition
of the stress-energy tensor. All observers, both inertial and accelerating, will still conclude that the
ambient stress-energy tensor is that of the vacuum state. Is Unruh radiance, then, physical or not?
Is it “real” radiation? Well, in the sense that it is a phenomenon that all observers will agree on,
one that manifests itself in directly observable effects, yes; in the sense that it does not contribute
to the stress-energy of spacetime, no.
Now, consider the question “do electrons exist?” On its face, it seems immune to the sorts
of problems I raise about the ontic status of spatiotemporal structure. Surely one can attribute
canonical significance to the question “do electrons exist?” independent of investigative framework?
In fact, one cannot. Think of the different contexts in which the concept of an electron may come
into play, and the natural ways in those contexts one may want to attribute physicality (or not) to
46See Wald (1994) for a rigorous exposition of the phenomenon.
47Roughly speaking, the resolution of the paradox turns on the fact that an accelerating system in Minkowski
spacetime occupies a negative energy-state: the accelerating detector, in dropping to an energy level beneath that
of the ambient vacuum, registers the vacuum as having positive energy, which the accelerating observer interprets
as having “detected a particle”; the inertial observer, however, accounts for the drop in the accelerating detector’s
energy by concluding that it emitted a particle, and so changed its state. If one likes, one may take this as one way
to make precise the idea that “particle” is not a natural notion in quantum field theory, and is indeed at times not
only not useful but downright obfuscatory.
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electrons. A small sample:
• as a component in a quantum, non-relativistic model of the Hydrogen atom
• as an element in the relativistic computation of the Lamb shift
• as a possible “constituent” of Hawking radiation in an analysis of its spectrum
• as a measuring device in the observation of parton structure from deep inelastic scattering of
electrons off protons, as modeled by the Standard Model
In the first case, one may want to attribute physicality to the electron in so far as its associated
quantities enter into the initial-value formulation of the system’s equations of motion; in the second,
one may base the attribution on the fact that one identifies the electron as the bearer of definite
values for the kinematic Casimir invariants of spin and mass; there is no good definition in general
of an electron in the third, because there is no unambiguous, physically significant definition of
“particle” in quantum field theory on a curved spacetime, and so a fortiori no way to attribute
physicality to such a thing;48 in the fourth and final case, one can attribute physicality to the
electron because one can associate localized charge, spin and lepton number with the mass-energy
resonance that represents it. Now, one cannot even formulate in a rigorous, precise way (and, indeed,
often not even in a loose and frowzy way) the criterion for physicality in any of these frameworks in
the terms of at least some of the others.
It follows that even in this case any formulation of the question in abstract terms, such as “what
all observers agree on” or “what has manifestly observable effects” or “what couples with other
systems we already think of as physical” or “what is essential to the formulation of the theory”,
remains empty until one renders content to it by the fixation of a framework, even if only schematic.
To be clear, I do not claim that one must always make the investigative framework of one’s work
explicit, only that one ought to recognize it must be there in the background, specifiable when push
comes to shove, as it will from time to time.
In the picture I have implicitly relied on in the construction of my arguments, the structure of
physics may be thought of as something like a differential manifold itself, with different techniques
and concepts that find appropriate application in different sorts of investigation, and even in similar
sorts of investigation of different subject matters, all covering their own idiosyncratic patches of
the global manifold, consonant with each other when they overlap but with none necessarily able
to cover the entirety of the space. In that vein, I am confident there are many other interesting
senses one can render to the idea of the physicality of putative entities and structures represented
by our best physical theories, variously useful or at least illuminating in investigations of different
sorts. In some of those senses, one will rightly, or at least usefully or suggestively, say those things
are physical. In others, one will not. The words we use to further all the sorts of scientific and
philosophical investigations we pursue do not matter, only the concepts behind the words, some of
which find natural application in some investigations and some of which do not.
48In essence, this is because one has no privileged group of timelike symmetries in a generic spacetime, as one has
in Minkowski spacetime, on which to ground the notion of a particle. See Wald (1994) for a detailed explanation.
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This is not instrumentalism. Among other things, I neither make nor rely on any privileged
claim about how one ought to understand the structures of our best theories as formal systems,
the terms and relations with which we formulate them, and their broader or deeper relation to the
world itself, only about how we ought not understand them. The greatest physicists have always, it
seems to me, had the capacity to to think in both realist and instrumentalist ways about both the
best contemporary theories and the most promising lines of theoretical attack as they were being
developed. Often, they held both sorts of views in their minds at the same time, keeping many
avenues open, sometimes moving forward along one, sometimes switching to another, sometimes
straddling the line, as best befit the demands of the investigation, with a concomitant gain in
richness of conception and depth of thought.49 In some contexts and for some purposes it is most
useful to conceive, think and speak in realist terms, and in others to do so in instrumentalist terms.
They are both good in their place, and neither is correct sub specie æternitatis. In any event, what
I sketch here is certainly not anti-realism.
I am not against asking questions that, in traditional terms, seem to bear on issues of realism and
instrumentalism. I am against the focus on the questions as meaningful and valuable in themselves,
without regard to the roles they may or may not play in the ongoing enterprise of our scientific
attempts to comprehend the physical world. That focus, it seems to me, leads only to a sterile
form of ideological back-and-forth that has all but crowded out the possibility of formulating and
addressing questions of real scientific and philosophical clarity and value. I take that to be the thrust
of the epigraph from Maxwell at the head of this paper.
References
Alexandrov, P. (1957). Combinatorial Topology: The Betti Groups, Volume 2. Rochester, NY:
Graylock Press. A translation by H. Komm of the first Russian edition of 1947.
Belot, G. (1996, September). Why general relativity does need an interpretation. Philosophy
of Science 63, Supplement: Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of
Science Association. Part i: Contributed Papers, S80–S88. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.
org/stable/188514.
Belot, G. (1999). Rehabilitating relationalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Sci-
ence 13 (1), 35–52. doi:10.1080/02698599908573606.
Belot, G. (2011). Geometric Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Belot, G. and J. Earman (2001). Pre-Socratic quantum gravity. In C. Callender and N. Huggett
(Eds.), Philosophy Meets Physics at the Planck Scale, pp. 213–255. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bengtsson, I., S. Holst, and E. Jakobsson (2014). Classics illustrated: Limits of spacetimes. Clas-
sical and Quantum Gravity 31 (20), 205008. doi:10.1088/0264-9381/31/20/205008. Preprint
49Stein (1977, 1990, unpub) forcefully argues this line of thought.
37
available at arXiv:1406.4326v2 [gr-qc].
Bergmann, P. and A. Komar (1960, April). Poisson brackets between locally defined observables
in general relativity. Physical Review Letters 4, 432–433. doi:10.1103/PhysRevLett.4.432.
Bergmann, P. and A. Komar (1962). Observables and commutation relations. In A. Lichnerowicz
and A. Tonnelat (Eds.), Les The´ories Relativistes de la Gravitation, Number 91 in Colloques
Internationaux, pp. 309–325. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Proceedings
of a conference held at Royaumont in June, 1959.
Biss, D. (2000). A generalized approach to the fundamental group. American Mathematical
Monthly 107 (8), 711–720. doi:10.2307/2695468.
Butterfield, J. (1984). Relationism and possible worlds. British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 35 (2), 101–113. doi:doi:10.1093/bjps/35.2.101.
Butterfield, J. (1989). The hole truth. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (1), 1–28.
doi:10.1093/bjps/40.1.1.
Carnap, R. (1956). Empiricism, semantics and ontology. In Meaning and Necessity: A Study in
Semantics and Modal Logic (Second ed.)., pp. 205–221. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press. An earlier version was published in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4(1950):20–40.
Chevalley, C. (1947). Theory of Lie Groups i. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 8th
printing, 1970.
Curiel, E. (1999). The analysis of singular spacetimes. Philosophy of Science 66 (S1), 119–
145. A more recent version, with corrections and emendations, is available at http://
strangebeautiful.com/phil-phys.html.
Curiel, E. (2001). A plea for modesty: Against the current excesses in quantum gravity.
Philosophy of Science 68 (3), S424–S441. doi:10.1086/392926. Preprint available at http:
//strangebeautiful.com/phil-phys.html.
Curiel, E. (2009). General relativity needs no interpretation. Philosophy of Science 76 (1), 44–
72. doi:10.1086/599277. Preprint is available at http://strangebeautiful.com/phil-phys.
html.
Curiel, E. (2014a). The geometry of the Euler-Lagrange equation. Unpublished manuscript, most
recent version available at http://strangebeautiful.com/phil-phys.html.
Curiel, E. (2014b). On geometric objects, the non-existence of a gravitational stress-energy
tensor, and the uniqueness of the einstein field equation. Submitted to Studies in His-
tory and Philosophy of Modern Physics, August 2014. Latest version available at http:
//strangebeautiful.com/phil-phys.html.
Curiel, E. (2014c). A primer on energy conditions. In D. Lehmkuhl (Ed.), Towards a Theory of
Spacetime Theories, Einstein Studies. Berlin: Birka¨user. Preprint available at arXiv:1405.0403
[gr-qc], and at http://strangebeautiful.com/phil-phys.html.
38
DiSalle, R. (1994). On dynamics, indiscernibility, and spacetime ontology. British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science 45 (1), 265–287. doi:10.1093/bjps/45.1.265.
DiSalle, R. (2006). Understanding Space-Time: The Philosophical Development of Physics from
Newton to Einstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dorato, M. (2000, October). Substantivalism, relationism, and structural spacetime realism. Foun-
dations of Physics 30 (10), 1605–1628. doi:10.1023/A:1026442015519.
Dorato, M. (2006). Is structural spacetime realism relationism in disguise? the supererogatory
nature of the substantivalism/relationism debate. In D. Dieks (Ed.), The Ontology of Spacetime
ii, Chapter 2, pp. 17–37. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. doi:10.1016/S1871-1774(08)00002-8.
Preprint available at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/3393/.
Earman, J. (1989). World Enough and Space-Time: Absolute versus Relational Theories of Space
and Time. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Earman, J. (2013). No superluminal propagation for classical relativistic and relativistic quantum
fields. Unpublished manuscript. http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10945/.
Earman, J. and J. Norton (1987, December). What price spacetime substantivalism? The hole
story. Philosophy of Science 38 (4), 515–525. doi:10.1093/bjps/38.4.515.
Ehlers, J. and R. Geroch (2004, January). Equation of motion of small bodies in relativity. An-
nals of Physics 309 (1), 232–236. doi:10.1016/j.aop.2003.08.020. Preprint available at arXiv:gr-
qc/0309074.
Einstein, A. (1914). Die formale Grundlage der allgemeinen Relativita¨tstheorie. Ko¨niglich
Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin)—Phys.-math. Klasse Sitzungsberichte
1914, 1030–1085.
Einstein, A. (1924). U¨ber den A¨ther. Schweizerische naturforschende Gesellschaft, Verhanflun-
gen 105, 85–93. Available in translation (by S. Saunders) as “On the Ether”, in The Philosophy
of Vacuum, eds. S. Saunders and H. Brown, Oxford University Press:Oxford, 1991, pp. 13–20.
Einstein, A. and M. Grossmann (1914). Kovarianzeigenschaften der Feldgleichungen der auf die
verallgemeinerte Relativita¨tstheorie gegru¨ndeten Gravitationstheorie. Zeitschrift fu¨r Mathe-
matik und Physik 63, 215–225.
Friedman, M. (2007, March). Essay review: Understanding Space-Time. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (1), 216–225. doi:0.1016/j.shpsb.2006.10.001.
Gaul, M. and C. Rovelli (2000). Loop quantum gravity and the meaning of diffeomorphism invari-
ance. In J. Kowalski-Glikman (Ed.), Towards Quantum Gravity, Volume 541 of Lecture Notes
in Physics, Berlin, pp. 277–324. Springer-Verlag. Preprint available at arXiv:gr-qc/99100079v2.
Geroch, R. (1967). Topology in general relativity. Journal of Mathematical Physics 8 (4), 782–786.
doi:10.1063/1.1705276.
39
Geroch, R. (1969). Limits of spacetimes. Communications in Mathematical Physics 13 (3),
180–193. doi:10.1007/BF01645486. Open access at http://projecteuclid.org/euclid.cmp/
1103841574.
Geroch, R. (1996). Partial differential equations of physics. In G. Hall and J. Pulham (Eds.),
General Relativity, Aberdeen, Scotland, pp. 19–60. Scottish Universities Summer School in
Physics. Proceedings of the 46th Scottish Universities Summer School in Physics, Aberdeen,
July 1995. Preprint available at arXiv:gr-qc/9602055.
Geroch, R. (2010). Faster than light? arXiv:1005.1614 [gr-qc].
Hawking, S. and G. Ellis (1973). The Large Scale Structure of Space-Time. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hoefer, C. (1996). The metaphysics of space-time substantivalism. The Journal of Philoso-
phy xciii, 5–27.
Hoefer, C. (1998). Absolute versus relational spacetime: For better or worse, the debate goes on.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3), 451–467. doi:10.1093/bjps/49.3.451.
Huggett, N. (2006). The regularity account of relational spacetime. Mind 115, 41–73.
doi:10.1093/mind/fx1041.
Kasner, E. (1921). Geometrical theorems on Einstein’s cosmological equations. American Journal
of Mathematics 43, 217–221.
Kelley, J. (1955). General Topology. The University Series in Higher Mathematics. Princeton:
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.
Lehmkuhl, D. (2011). Mass-energy-momentum: Only there because of spacetime? British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 62 (3), 453–488. doi:10.1093/bjps/axr003.
Malament, D. (2012). Topics in the Foundations of General Relativity and Newtonian Grav-
itational Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Uncorrected final proofs for
the book are available for download at http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/
malament-founds-gr-ngt.pdf.
Manchak, J. (2009, January). Can we know the global structure of spacetime? Studies in History
and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (1), 53–56. doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2008.07.004.
Manchak, J. (2011, July). What is a physically reasonable spacetime? Philosophy of Science 78 (3),
410–420. doi:10.1086/660301.
Maudlin, T. (1990, December). Substances and space-time: What Aristotle would have said
to Einstein. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 21 (4), 531–561. doi:10.1016/0039-
3681(90)90032-4.
Maudlin, T. (1993, June). Buckets of water and waves of space: Why spacetime is probably
a substance. Philosophy of Science 60 (2), 183–203. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/
stable/188350.
40
Maxwell, J. C. (1875). Attraction. In Encyclopædia Britannica (ix ed.), Volume iii, pp. 63–65.
Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black. Reprinted in The Scientific Papers of J. C. Maxwell (2
volumes printed as one), Volume ii, W. Niven (Ed.). New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1965, 485–491.
Maxwell, J. C. (1877). Matter and Motion. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. Originally pub-
lished in 1877. This edition is a 1952 unaltered republication of the 1920 Larmor edition.
Maxwell, J. C. (1888). Theory of Heat. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc. The Dover edition of
2001 republishes in unabridged form the ninth edition of 1888 published by Longmans, Green
and Co., London, and also includes the corrections and notes of Lord Rayleigh incorporated
into the edition of 1891.
Misner, C., K. Thorne, and J. Wheeler (1973). Gravitation. San Francisco: Freeman Press.
Norton, J. (1989). How Einstein found his field equations, 1912–1915. In D. Howard and J. Stachel
(Eds.), Einstein and the History of General Relativity, Volume 1 of Einstein Studies, pp. 101–
159. Berlin: Birkhau¨ser. The proceedings of the 1986 Osgood Hill Conference, North Andover,
MA, 8–11 May 1986.
Norton, J. (1993). General covariance and the foundations of general relativity: Eight decades of
dispute. Reports on Progress in Physics 56 (1), 791–858. doi:10.1088/0034-4885/56/7/001.
Paiva, F., M. Rebouc¸as, and M. MacCallum (1993). On limits of spacetimes—A coordinate-free
approach. Classical and Quantum Gravity 10 (6), 1165–1178. doi:10.1088/0264-9381/10/6/013.
Preprint available at arXiv:gr-qc/9302005.
Pons, J. and D. Salisbury (2005). The issue of time in generally covariant theories and the
Komar-Bergmann approach to observables in general relativity. Physical Review D 71, 124012.
doi:10.1103/PhysRevD.71.124012. Preprint available at arXiv:gr-qc/0503013v1.
Pooley, O. (2006). Points, particles and structural realism. In D. Rickles, S. French, and J. Saatsi
(Eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity, pp. 83–120. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Pooley, O. (2013). Substantivalist and relationalist approaches to spacetime. In R. Batterman
(Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ruetsche, L. (2011). Interpreting Quantum Theories. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rynasiewicz, R. (1994). The lessons of the hole argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 45 (2), 407–436. doi:10.1093/bjps/45.2.407.
Rynasiewicz, R. (1996, June). Absolute versus relational space-time: An outmoded debate? The
Journal of Philosophy xciii(6), 279–306.
Stachel, J. (1993). The meaning of general covariance: The hole story. In J. Earman, A. Ja-
nis, G. Massey, and N. Rescher (Eds.), Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External
Worlds: Essays on the Philosophy of Adolf Gru¨nbaum, pp. 129–162. Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press/Universita¨tsverlag Konstanz.
41
Stein, H. (1977). Some philosophical prehistory of general relativity. In C. G. Earman, J. and
J. Stachel (Eds.), Foundations of Space-Time Theories, Volume vii of Minnesota Studies in
Philosophy of Science, pp. 3–49. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Stein, H. (1989, June). Yes, but. . . : Some skeptical remarks on realism and anti-realism. Dialec-
tica 43 (1-2), 47–65. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00930.x.
Stein, H. (1990). On Locke, “the Great Huygenius, and the Incomparable Mr. Newton”. In
P. Bricker and R. Hughes (Eds.), Perspectives on Newtonian Science, pp. 17–47. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Stein, H. (1994). Some reflections on the structure of our knowledge in physics. In D. Prawitz,
B. Skyrms, and D. Westerst˚ahl (Eds.), Logic, Metholodogy and Philosophy of Science, Pro-
ceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science,
pp. 633–55. New York: Elsevier Science B.V. I do not have access to the published version of
Stein’s paper, but rather only to a typed manuscript. All references to page numbers, therefore,
do not correspond to those of the published version. The typed manuscript I have is about 17
pages long, and the published version about 22. Multiplying the page numbers I give by 1722
and adding the result to 633 (the number of the first page in the published version) should
give approximately the page number in the published version.
Stein, H. (unpub). Physics and philosophy meet: The strange case of Poincare´. Typed manuscript
not submitted for publication.
Thom, R. (1969). Ensembles et morphismes stratifie´s. Bulletin of the American Mathematical
Society 75, 240–284. doi:10.1090/S0002-9904-1969-12138-5.
Wald, R. (1984). General Relativity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wald, R. (1994). Quantum Field Theory in Curved Spacetime and Black Hole Thermodynamics.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wald, R. and S. Gao (2001). “Physical process version” of the First Law and the General-
ized Second Law for charged and rotating black holes. Physical Review D 64 (8), 084020.
doi:10.1103/PhysRevD.64.084020.
Weatherall, J. (2014). Regarding the ‘hole argument’. Forthcoming in British Journal for Philos-
ophy of Science, 2015.
42
